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Mass shootings, such as the killing of school children and staff in
Newtown, Connecticut, have provided brutal reminders of inadequacies
in our nation’s mental health system. In the wake of these shootings,
President Obama asserted that “[w]e are going to need to work on
making access to mental health care as easy as access to a gun.” But
what should society do when the person needing mental health
treatment refuses care—when the problem is not rooted in access but in
free will? When is involuntary treatment justified? In deciding whether
to forcibly medicate, multiple interests come into play, including patient
autonomy, public safety, and the patient’s medical welfare. As a society,
we have overemphasized patient autonomy and underemphasized
patient welfare to the detriment not only of the patient’s well-being but
also of public safety—and even to the detriment of patient autonomy
itself. This Article briefly examines the history of the involuntary
treatment debate and how society arrived at the present imbalance. It
then considers the implications of current scientific research on the
brain and the nature of severe mental illness, using schizophrenia as an
illustrative example. The Article explains how current involuntary
treatment standards could be revised to reflect this scientific
understanding and continue protecting a patient’s civil rights without
making undue sacrifices of the patient’s long-term health and wellbeing. It also defends the proposed new standard against potential
constitutional challenges.
The new standard would allow involuntary treatment for a
limited number of years after onset of severe psychotic symptoms under
specified conditions. It would also provide for more access to medical
information by patients’ immediate family members and primary
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caretakers. The standard reflects (1) research showing the vital
importance of early treatment for long-term prognosis and prevention
of irreversible injury to the brain; (2) statistics suggesting the
particular vulnerability of a maturing brain; (3) a respect for autonomy
and the patient’s ultimate agency to reject treatment if no satisfactory
treatment option can be found; (4) consideration of factors that
uniquely affect autonomy concerns when patients are severely
psychotic; and (5) research demonstrating that family involvement can
greatly benefit treatment outcomes. Because brain science is currently
an area of explosive growth and discovery, this Article recognizes that
any involuntary treatment standard will need to be continually reexamined and revised in light of scientific progress.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It must be remembered that for the person with severe
mental illness who has no treatment the most dreaded of
confinements can be the imprisonment inflicted by his own
mind, which shuts reality out and subjects him to the
torment of voices and images beyond our powers to
describe.1
Mental health issues have been brought to the forefront of
national debate by a series of tragic episodes. Deadly violence
erupted at a political gathering in an Arizona parking lot, at a Batman
showing in a Colorado movie theater, and at an elementary school in
Connecticut.2 Such events can distort the public perception of the
severely mentally ill, most of whom are not a danger to society.3 But
the accompanying perception that this nation’s mental health system
is in desperate need of reform is a fact.
In the wake of these events, President Obama declared the
necessity of “making access to mental health care as easy as access
to a gun.”4 While knowledge of and access to appropriate services
are certainly vital issues, they do not address the full problem—for
what if a patient refuses the treatment offered? What if the problem
is rooted not in access but in free will?
Even when concerned family or friends of a severely mentally ill
individual know where to turn for help and have the resources to do

09/23/2014 13:40:53
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1. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 609–10 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
2. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Tough Legal Issues Converge in Colorado Shooting Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/us/james-holmes-case-raises-complex
-legal-issues.html?_r=1 (discussing both the Arizona and Colorado cases); David Brooks & Gail
Collins, The Newtown Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 19, 2012, 1:24 PM), http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/the-newtown-aftermath/?hp (discussing mental health
and gun control issues stemming from the Connecticut incident).
3. Sally Satel, Enforce the Laws, Don’t Add to Them, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/17/can-mental-health-care-reduce-gun-violence
/enforce-mental-health-laws-dont-add-to-them (Approximately “3 to 5 percent of violent crimes
in the general population” can be attributed to mentally ill persons “whose symptoms are
unmedicated and/or who abuse stimulants or alcohol.”); Thomas Insel, Understanding Severe
Mental Illness, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about
/director/2011/understanding-severe-mental-illness.shtml (“[M]ental illness contributes very little
to the overall rate of violence in the community.”).
4. Valerie Strauss, Obama’s Proposals on School Safety, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2013/01/16/obamas-proposals-on-school
-safety/.

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 134 Side A

09/23/2014 13:40:53

RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC?

Fall 2013]

A RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC?

9/1/2014 6:48 PM

255

C M
Y K

09/23/2014 13:40:53

5. Adam Lanza’s Motive: Did Fear of Being Committed Lead to Sandy Hook Elementary
Shooting?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012
/12/19/adam-lanza-motive_n_2329508.html.
6. E. Fuller Torrey & Doris A. Fuller, The Potential Killers We Let Loose: The U.S. Would
Have Fewer Mass Killings if Individuals with Severe Mental Illness Received Proper Treatment,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873244075045781853
61458883822.html.
7. See Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but
Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1103, 1137 (2008).
8. See Editorial, A Decade for Psychiatric Disorders, 463 NATURE 9 (2010), available at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v463/n7277/full/463009a.html.
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so, there are legal hurdles to forcing an unwilling patient to receive
treatment. There have been reports that the mother of Adam Lanza,
the man who killed twenty children and six adults at an elementary
school, may have been seeking to have her son committed to a
hospital before she, too, was killed.5 If she was seeking involuntary
treatment for Adam, she was doing so in Connecticut, which has
been criticized as “among the worst states to seek such treatment”
with “among the weakest involuntary treatment laws.”6
Such laws were created to protect the civil liberties of
individuals who resist medical treatment. The movement to create
these laws stemmed from serious abuses of many mentally ill
patients who had been constrained under horrible conditions. This
Article does not take issue with the importance of such civil liberties
and autonomy interests. Instead, it argues that in reacting to abuses in
history, the pendulum has swung too far. The modern legal debate
regarding involuntary treatment has failed to sufficiently weigh the
welfare of the patient in its analysis, especially given emerging
scientific research about the nature of severe mental illness and its
treatments. Autonomy concerns do not fall by the wayside, but this
Article explains why they should be given less emphasis under the
current scientific regime.
Knowledge of the human brain is expanding exponentially due
to new technologies that allow scientists to study living brains in
unprecedented ways,7 and our laws have failed to keep sufficient
pace with that changing scientific understanding in the mental health
sphere. Nature, one of the world’s premiere science journals, has
labeled this as a “decade for psychiatric disorders” because of the
“many ways in which the understanding and treatment of conditions
such as schizophrenia are ripe for a revolution.”8 Although there
have been tremendous scientific advances, scientists and scholars
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9. See, e.g., Kathleen Kocks, Illuminating the Mind, GEO. WASH. RES. (Fall 2011),
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~magazine/archive/2011_research_fall/feature6.html (quoting
Dr. Anthony-Samuel LaMantia, founding director of the George Washington University Institute
for Neuroscience).
10. See, e.g., Esther Pousa Tomas, Effectiveness of Family Work Interventions on
Schizophrenia: Evidence from a Multicenter Study in Catalonia, 58 INT’L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY
587, 588 (2011), available at http://isp.sagepub.com/content/58/6/587.full.pdf+html.
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recognize that given the extreme complexity of the brain,
neuroscience is still in its infancy9—and thus as the science
continues to progress, further revisions of legal standards will likely
be necessary.
This Article proposes a new standard for involuntary treatment
that incorporates relevant insights from current science. The standard
offers an additional set of circumstances under which forcible
treatment could be justified beyond those outlined in existing law.
The standard is discussed more fully in Part IV, but its essence is that
(1) if earnest efforts have been made to try to convince a patient to
take needed medications voluntarily (including exploration of the
reasons for refusal and possible alternatives to address such
concerns); (2) and if involuntary treatment would be in the best
medical interest of the patient; (3) then involuntary treatment would
be allowed for as long as necessary to stabilize a case of severe and
active psychosis. However, this standard could only be used for two
years after the onset of such severe symptoms or age 27, whichever
is later. These time limits respond to research showing the vital
importance of early treatment for long-term prognosis and prevention
of irreversible injury to the brain, as well as the particular
vulnerability of a young, maturing brain. The time limits also reflect
a respect for autonomy and the individual’s ultimate agency to reject
treatment if no satisfactory treatment option can be found—tempered
by factors that reduce certain autonomy concerns when a patient is
severely psychotic. The new standard would also allow more access
to medical information by the immediate family members and
primary caretakers whose support, research shows, can be vital to
successful treatment efforts.10
This proposed standard would make it easier to forcibly
medicate an individual at earlier stages of disease. For that minority
of severely mentally ill patients prone to become violent—the
standard could help to prevent allowing them to deteriorate so far as
to become a significant public threat. In this way, it would increase
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II. INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT
A. Brief Background: Medical and Social History of This Nation’s
Severely Mentally Ill
To understand the involuntary treatment debate, one must begin
with some understanding of the history of this nation’s evolving
attitudes toward and treatment of its severely mentally ill.
For centuries, psychotic individuals were believed to be
possessed by demons.12 In colonial times, many such people were

C M
Y K

09/23/2014 13:40:53

11. See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to “Just Say No”: A History and Analysis of the Right
to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 288 (1992).
12. Thomas H. McGlashan, Treatment Timing vs Treatment Type in First-Episode
Psychosis: A Paradigm Shift in Strategy and Effectiveness, 38 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 902,
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public safety, but the focus of the standard is on what is in the best
medical interest of the patient, while still preserving important
autonomy interests. Thus, the focus is on a state’s parens patriae
interest rather than its police powers.11 Every state retains its police
power to confine anyone who is an imminent danger, but the hope is
that society could help patients get necessary treatment long before
such dire circumstances develop.
Part II of this Article discusses the involuntary treatment debate.
It includes a brief summary of the medical and legal history of the
issue—and how the laws have responded to scientific developments
in the past. It clarifies the opposing arguments and the current status
of the law, which is rapidly changing due to political rallying after
the Newtown shootings. Part III examines the evolving scientific
understanding of the causes, effects, and treatments of severe mental
illness, using schizophrenia as an illustrative example, and how that
understanding is relevant to the debate over when the severely
mentally ill should be treated against their expressed desires. Part IV
proposes reform and explains why the new standard introduced in
this Article would rationally reflect current scientific data and
adequately balance autonomy and patient welfare interests. Part V
addresses constitutional concerns and why the new standard should
survive them. The Conclusion recognizes that in light of the rapid
scientific advances in understanding the human brain and mental
illness, this Article’s proposal is one that should also be subject to
future revision.
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902
(2012),
available
at
http://schizophreniabulletin.oxfordjournals.org/content/38/5
/902.full.pdf+html.
13. PETE EARLEY, CRAZY: A FATHER’S SEARCH THROUGH AMERICA’S MENTAL HEALTH
MADNESS 64 (2006).
14. Id. at 65.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 65–67.
17. Id. at 67 (citing ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES (MENTAL ILLNESS AND
SOCIAL POLICY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE) (1948)).
18. Id. at 66–70.
19. Alicia B. Minns & Richard Clark, Toxicology and Overdose of Atypical Antipsychotics,
43 J. OF EMERGENCY MED. 906 (2012), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science
/article/pii/S0736467912003587.
20. Id. at 906.
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either locked in jail or watched over by their own families.13 A
turning point for the United States occurred in 1843, when Dorothea
Dix was visiting a Boston jail to teach Bible classes. As she passed
through the building, she noted that a portion of the jail was not
heated. When she objected, she was informed there was no need to
heat that area because it housed the insane.14 Over the next several
decades, Ms. Dix actively campaigned for better treatment of the
severely mentally ill. She argued they required medical treatment
rather than penal punishment. She convinced approximately thirty
states to open asylums so that the mentally ill could be removed from
jails. By 1900, every state had a mental institution.15
What began as a crusade with the best of intentions, however,
degenerated into a serious problem of its own over the next half
century. Many state mental hospitals became scenes of terrible abuse
and neglect.16 Indeed, one book on the subject found that they
provided comparable conditions to the Nazi concentration camps of
World War II.17 News reports reflecting this kind of information and
the release of an extremely disturbing and popular fictional movie on
the subject (One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest) created public
outrage and political pressure for change.18
Meanwhile, on the medical front, significant changes had
occurred. Before the discovery of today’s antipsychotic drugs,
patients suffering from severe psychotic disorders were often treated
with sedatives such as barbiturates.19 They were “housed in
institutions for indefinite periods of time, and treatment was often
unsuccessful.”20
A major breakthrough in psychiatric treatment came in 1952
when a French surgeon was investigating ways to reduce surgical
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Jennifer C. Seida et al., FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION ANTIPSYCHOTICS FOR
CHILDREN AND ADULTS 1–2 (2012) available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth
/PMH0040940/pdf/TOC.pdf
25. EARLEY, supra note 13, at 69.
26. See id. at 71; NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, SCHIZOPHRENIA 10 [hereinafter NIMH,
SCHIZOPHRENIA] available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/schizophrenia
/schizophrenia-booket-2009.pdf (last revised 2009).
27. E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., NO ROOM AT THE INN:
TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLOSING PUBLIC PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS, 7 (2012), available
at http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/no_room_at_the_inn-2012.pdf.
28. Minns & Clark, supra note 19.
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shock. He “noticed that an antihistamine he was using,
chlorpromazine, had a powerful calming effect on mentation.”21
Hearing about these results, a psychiatrist, Pierre Denker, tried the
drug on some of his most difficult patients. “The results were
remarkable, and chlorpromazine was approved by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in 1954.”22 Thus, the drug was not
developed with any understanding of the underlying diseases or the
drug’s interactions with the brain—it was entirely a serendipitous
discovery based on the drug’s effects on behavior. A decade later,
approximately fifty million people had been treated with this
medication worldwide, and several other similar medications had
entered the market.23 These drugs have come to be known as firstgeneration or typical antipsychotics.24
Initially perceived by many as a miracle drug and cure-all for
mental illness,25 it would later become clear that such drugs were not
successful with all patients, did not treat all aspects of diseases such
as schizophrenia, and had severe potential side effects, including
tremors, rigidity, persistent muscle spasms, or restlessness26 and, in
rare cases, death. Still, the drugs were remarkable in that they did
make it possible to stabilize most severely mentally ill patients so
that they could live safely within communities as long as they had
access to treatment in community healthcare facilities.27
A second wave of antipsychotics would become available
around 1989.28 Known as second-generation or atypical
antipsychotics, these drugs were also effective in treating psychosis
but had fewer of the extrapyramidal side effects. However, these
drugs carry dangerous and undesirable potential side effects of their
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29. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 382 (3rd ed. 2007).
30. EARLEY, supra note 13, at 69.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 70–71.
33. TORREY ET AL., supra note 27, at 7.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id.
36. See EARLEY, supra note 13, at 71; Steven S. Sharfstein, Whatever Happened to
Community Mental Health?, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 616, 618 (2000), available at
http://psychiatryonline.org/data/Journals/PSS/3542/616.pdf; Mark Moran, Vision Revisited: 50
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own, including issues such as increased blood sugar, elevated lipids
and cholesterol, weight gain, and diabetes.29
President John F. Kennedy responded to some of these medical
and social events in 1963 by signing a national mental health law that
authorized expenditure of up to three billion dollars to construct
community-based mental health centers across the nation.30 The idea
was that state hospitals could shut down and patients could
successfully survive in the community, so long as they were
supported by the new drugs and these yet-to-be-created institutions.31
Thus the new law was, in large part, a direct response to the
scientific development of antipsychotic drugs.
State legislatures, responding to financial pressures, civil
lawsuits, public outrage, and the promise of federal funding for these
community institutions, began a massive closing of state hospitals.32
While in 1955 there were 558,922 state hospital beds for the severely
mentally ill, currently “95% of [those] public psychiatric hospital
beds [have] disappeared, but community psychiatric care exists for
fewer than half the patients who need it.”33 By 2010 there were
approximately the same number of state psychiatric beds per capita
as there had been in 1850 at the beginning of the movement to
provide more humane treatment for the seriously mentally ill—
approximately fourteen beds per 100,000 people.34 And, even with
the hugely diminished number of beds, the trend in downsizing
continues. A study showed that thirteen states had closed 25 percent
or more of their total state hospital beds between 2005 and 2010—
some states closing upwards of 50 percent.35
Why was the three billion dollars not spent to create thousands
of community health centers? Scholars cite multiple causes: the
prolonged Vietnam War, the distraction of Watergate, the Reagan
administration’s focus on federal downsizing, etc.36
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Years of the Community Mental Health Act, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsarticle.aspx?articleid=1769257; Michelle R. Smith,
Kennedy’s Vision for Mental Health Never Realized, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 20, 2013,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/kennedys-vision-mental-health-never-realized.
37. E. Fuller Torrey, Fifty Years of Failing America’s Mentally Ill, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323539804578260023200841756.html.
38. Id.
39. See EARLEY, supra note 13, at 71; Shijie Feng, Madness and Mayhem: Reforming the
Mental Health Care System in Arizona, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 541, 546–47 (2012).
40. See EARLEY, supra note 13, at 71.
41. Dr. J. Jaffe, Op-Ed., Require Therapists to Warn of Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/17/can-mental-health-care-reduce-gun-violence
/require-therapists-to-warn-authorities-of-danger.
42. Pete Earley, Saks Institute Distinguished Lecture (Nov. 15, 2012), available at
http://lawmedia.usc.edu/mediasite/play/80b008e1e8284e35ab12db25fb2a45b7.
43. Renee Montagne, Inside the Nation’s Largest Mental Institution, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Apr. 13, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93581736.
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Some argue that the underlying problem was not that the money
was unspent and the centers were never created in anything close to
the numbers promised, but that those community mental health
centers that were created never focused on caring for the most
severely mentally ill patients released from the hospitals. Instead, the
centers focused on those with much less severe mental health
issues—“the worried well.”37 “Federal studies reported individuals
discharged from state hospitals initially made up between 4% and
7% of the [community mental health centers’] patient load, and the
longer the [center] was in existence the lower this percentage
became.”38
With state hospitals largely closed down and insufficient
community resources to provide the support needed for successful
integration into the community (for those that could be stabilized
with proper medication and therapeutic support), prisons, jails, and
the streets began filling with the displaced mentally ill.39 Mental
health publications in the 1990s began to reference
“transinstitutionalization,” meaning the transfer of the mentally ill
from the state hospitals to jails.40 A mentally ill person is three times
more likely to be incarcerated than hospitalized, and there are
thirty-five thousand suicides by the mentally ill annually.41 It is
estimated that there are currently 360,000 severely mentally ill
people in our jails and prisons, half a million on probation, and more
than a million that are processed through the criminal justice system
every year.42 Today, the largest public mental health facility in the
nation is a wing of the Los Angeles county jail.43 Thus, we seem to
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have come full circle—once again punishing, rather than treating,
our severely mentally ill.44
The shootings at Newtown that killed twenty children and six
staff members at Sandy Hook Elementary School,45 as well as the
shooter’s mother, refocused the nation on mental health issues.
Indeed, never before had the political body reacted with such speed
and determination to address a host of mental health issues, including
issues related to treatment. In the beginning of 2013, the Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions Committee of the United States
Senate held a hearing on mental health. The chairman of that
committee said it “was the first time in six years that the panel had
really returned to a focus on mental illness.”46
B. History and Explanation of the Involuntary Treatment Debate
Although it seems clear that the state legislatures’ closures of
state hospitals were mainly a response to financial incentives,
another impetus for change was the concurrent wave of civil suits
aiming to protect the civil liberties of the severely mentally ill.47
These suits changed the legal landscape in regard to involuntary
treatment options. They also served as a focal point for the
articulation of different visions of the needs, rights, and welfare of
the severely mentally ill.
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44. It is estimated that less than 50 percent of people with mental illness receive treatment.
Erlanger A. Turner, Op-Ed., Improve Access, Erase the Stigma, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/17/can-mental-health-care-reduce-gun-violence
/improve-access-to-health-care-and-erase-its-stigma.
45. See generally Marc Santora, A Bleak Procession of Funerals for Shooting Victims Ends
in Newtown, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/23/nyregion
/newtown-mourns-last-of-its-children-killed-in-massacre.html (explaining the Newtown shooting
and burial of the victims).
46. Paige Winfield Cunningham, Newtown Renews Panel’s Focus on Mental Health,
POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2013, 5:01 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/newtown-renewspanels-focus-on-mental-health-86697.html?hp=r2 (citing Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)).
47. See EARLEY, supra note 13, at 70–71.
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1. Different Perspectives: Medical Model v. Civil Rights Model
The suits aimed at protecting the civil rights of severely
mentally ill patients stemmed from a fundamental disagreement
between those concerned with treating a patient’s illness and those
concerned with protecting a patient’s autonomy and human rights.
These two perspectives have been termed the medical and the civil
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rights models, respectively—or, at times, over-generalized as a
struggle between doctors and lawyers.48
Those espousing the medical model tend to view health as the
predominant social value.49 Refusal of hospitalization or treatment
tends to be perceived as merely a symptom of the mental illness.50
Because the purpose of hospitalization is treatment, the medical
model views allowing one without the other as illogical.51 Because
treatment will restore people to their “right minds” (thus increasing
long-term capacities and freedoms), involuntary treatment is seen as
promoting rather than impeding autonomy in a broad sense.52
By contrast, the civil rights model prioritizes the values of
immediate freedom and noninterference with a patient’s present
choices53—thus interpreting autonomy in a more narrow sense than
the medical model. Whereas the medical model values well-being in
terms of physical health, the civil rights model values well-being in
terms of human dignity and respect.54 The civil rights model views
treatment resistance as an act of free will rather than a symptom of
illness. Advocates of this view would highlight examples such as the
fact that we allow people to choose to smoke or refuse chemotherapy
as evidence that people may rationally choose options that are not in
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C M
Y K

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 138 Side A

48. See ELYN SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY ILL 5–19 (2002); Jennifer Fischer, A Comparative Look at the Right to Refuse
Treatment for Involuntarily Hospitalized Persons with a Mental Illness, 29 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 153, 154–57 (Winter 2006); see also Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting With Others:
A Major Life Activity Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1139, 1145
(2002) (comparing the social model to the civil rights model); Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving
Disabilities”: Why the Definition of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should
Be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83, 100 (2000)
(demonstrating the legislative success of advocates of the civil rights model); Mary Crossley, The
Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649–59 (1999) (addressing the
differences between the “social model” and the “medical model”); Lars Noah, Pigeonholing
Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 291 (1999) (identifying
a period of time when disability programs subscribed to a rehabilitative rather than civil rights
model). There is also “[a] whole new school of mental health law called therapeutic jurisprudence
[that] takes as its task the evaluation of legal rules in terms of their therapeutic benefits or
detriments.” SAKS, supra, at 17. Therapeutic jurisprudence endeavors to find a middle road
between the medical and civil rights models that focuses on the “law’s healing potential.” Bruce
Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Counsel in Litigation, 37 CAL. W. L. REV.
105, 108 (2000).
49. Fischer, supra note 48, at 155.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 155–56; see SAKS, supra note 48, at 5–19.
53. SAKS, supra note 47, at 12.
54. Id. at 17.
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55. Fischer, supra note 47, at 156 (citing SAKS, supra note 47, at 46).
56. See id. at 156–57; SAKS, supra note 48, at 5–19.
57. See ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD: MY JOURNEY THROUGH MADNESS
(2007).
58. SAKS
INST.
FOR
MENTAL
HEALTH,
LAW,
POLICY
AND
ETHICS,
http://weblaw.usc.edu/centers/saks/ (last visited February 5, 2014); see also Benedict Carey,
Memoir About Schizophrenia Spurs Others to Come Forward, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/health/23livesside.html?_r=0 (noting that Dr. Saks won a
$500,000 MacArthur Foundation “genius” award).
59. See SAKS, supra note 57, at 2–4.
60. Id. at 262.
61. SAKS, supra note 48.
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their best medical interest—yet as a society we do not force them to
change related behavior.55 Likewise, the civil rights model demands
equality of treatment for the severely mentally ill who refuse medical
care.56
Among those who defend a patient’s right to refuse under most
circumstances is Professor Elyn R. Saks. She has long been a
renowned scholar of mental health law, but it was only in 2007 that
she revealed to the world her severe struggles with schizophrenia.57
Her best-selling book published that year, The Center Cannot Hold:
My Journey Through Madness, earned her a $500,000 MacArthur
Foundation “genius” award with which she has established the Saks
Institute for Mental Health Law, Policy, and Ethics at the University
of Southern California Gould School of Law “to study issues at the
intersection of law, mental health, and ethics as well as influence
policy reform and advocacy actions for improved treatment of people
with mental illness.”58 The Center Cannot Hold describes, among
other things, her severe psychotic break during which she was
forcibly medicated when she was studying law at Yale.59
On the issue of involuntary treatment she explains:
As someone who benefits from medication, I know that the
question of when one should be allowed to refuse is a
complicated one. But I also believe that individual
autonomy is vitally important, even precious—after all, it’s
central to who we are as humans on the planet, with free
will and self-ownership.60
Before publishing the book on her personal experiences,
Professor Saks had published another book entirely devoted to the
issue of refusing medical care.61 As will be discussed later in this
Article, she does support at least one measure that would be a
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62. See, e.g., id. at 89, 93–94.
63. See Carla K. Johnson & Patrick Condon, Shootings Expose Cracks in U.S. Mental
Health System, POST-TRIBUNE (Oct. 5, 2012, 4:14 PM), http://posttrib.suntimes.com/photos
/galleries/15536969-417/shootings-expose-cracks-in-us-mental-health-system.html (quoting Ms.
Saks, “Each time I tried to get off medication, I did it with great gusto and failed miserably. . . .
Frankly, I’m sorry I wasn’t smarter sooner.”).
64. See Dora W. Klein, Autonomy and Acute Psychosis: When Choices Collide, 15 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 355, 394–95 (2008).
65. Id. at 388 (quoting Harold I. Schwartz et al., Autonomy and the Right to Refuse
Treatment: Patients’ Attitudes After Involuntary Medication, 39 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 1049, 1054 (1988)).
66. Jim Randall, Helping Those Who Don’t Know They Want It, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006,
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/mar/12/opinion/oe-randall12.
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significant loosening of the restrictions on involuntary treatment but,
on the whole, would respect the choices of the mentally ill so long as
they are competent—even if psychotic and significantly impaired.62
This, despite her admission that she wishes she had not tried to get
off medication at some points in her life.63
One scholar, mirroring the medical model values, criticizes
Professor Saks’s position, in that if her autonomy had been respected
in terms of allowing her to refuse medication, she might have lacked
autonomy to make a host of other choices—beginning with returning
to school.64 “Strategies for protecting the autonomy of patients who
refuse medication must consider the serious erosion of autonomy that
psychosis produces.”65
The medical model’s response to civil rights arguments was
rather dramatically illustrated in a Los Angeles Times article by Jim
Randall, a former president of the National Alliance on Mental
Illness.
Civil libertarians say no—that it is our right to commit
crimes that land us in prison, that it is our choice to be so ill
that we prefer to forage through garbage and live on the
streets, that it is our prerogative to let voices in our heads
torment us into sleepless nights. But something tells me that
the people locked up in San Quentin with a mental illness,
and the people roving the back alleys of skid row, are not
singing “God Bless America.” These are our sons and
daughters, our brothers and sisters, and they need our
help.66
Thus, both the civil rights model and the medical model have
strong advocates who are passionately concerned about the welfare
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of the mentally ill. The two models prioritize and define their values
differently—yet both are concerned with some definition or vision of
patient welfare and autonomy.
While not necessarily adhering consistently to either of these
models for analysis, the legal scholarship on involuntary treatment
for the severely mentally ill generally leans toward the civil rights
model: if a position is taken on the proper standard, it tends to be an
argument for either the strong status quo or even more stringent
protections of the right to refuse.67 However, there are exceptions.68
2. Legal Battles Over Involuntary Treatment
“In the 1960s, at the height of the civil rights era, a small group
of young lawyers focused on the fact that the civil rights of
hospitalized psychiatric patients were being violated, which in many
instances was true.”69 Thomas Szasz’s book, The Myth of Mental
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67. See, e.g., Debra A. Breneman, Forcible Antipsychotic Medication and the Unfortunate
Side Effects of Sell v. United States, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 965, 966 (2004); Jennifer
Colangelo, The Right to Refuse Treatment for Mental Illness, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 492,
493 (2008); Kristina M. Campbell, Blurring the Lines of the Danger Zone, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173, 175 (2002); Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The Illusion of Sanity: The
Constitutional and Moral Danger of Medicating Condemned Prisoners in Order to Execute
Them, 76 TENN. L. REV. 641, 642, 658 (2009); John R. Hayes, Sell v. United States: Is
Competency Enough to Forcibly Medicate a Criminal Defendant?, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 657, 657 (2004); Dora W. Klein, Trial Rights and Psychotropic Drugs: The Case
Against Administering Involuntary Medications to A Defendant During Trial, 55 VAND. L. REV.
165, 170 (2002); Dora W. Klein, Unreasonable: Involuntary Medications, Incompetent Criminal
Defendants, and the Fourth Amendment, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 161, 162 (2009); Amanda E.
Lee, Protecting the Inmate’s Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 64 WASH. L. REV. 459, 460
(1989); Megan Quinlan, Forcible Medication and Personal Autonomy: The Case of Charles
Thomas Sell, 84 B.U. L. REV. 275, 299 (2004); David M. Siegel et al., Old Law Meets New
Medicine: Revisiting Involuntary Psychotropic Medication of the Criminal Defendant, 2001 WIS.
L. REV. 307, 313, 378 (2001).
68. Dora W. Klein, Involuntary Treatment of the Mentally Ill: Autonomy Is Asking the
Wrong Question, 27 VT. L. REV. 649, 653 (2003) (arguing for a standard “allow[ing] involuntary
treatment when, for someone who is mentally ill, the benefits achieved by involuntary
treatment—the relief of the most serious symptoms of the most serious mental illnesses—would
be sufficient to outweigh the harms caused . . . .”); see, e.g., Klein, supra note 64, at 394–95
(arguing that autonomy should not be the sole concern in analyzing involuntary treatment); see
also Lisa Kim Anh Nguyen, In Defense of Sell: Involuntary Medication and the Permanently
Incompetent Criminal Defendant, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 597, 623 (2005) (arguing not for a more
lenient standard but defending Sell partly on the basis that forced medication may prevent
indefinite detention); Bruce J. Winick, New Directions in the Right to Refuse Mental Health
Treatment: The Implications of Riggins v. Nevada, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 205, 238 (1993)
(arguing not for a more lenient standard but explicitly employing a therapeutic model of analysis).
69. E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE: HOW AMERICA’S FAILURE TO TREAT THE
SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS 3–4 (2012).
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See id. at 77–79.
See THOMAS SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS, at x, 2 (1961).
TORREY, supra note 69.
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 4–5.
Cichon, supra note 11, at 286.
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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72.
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Illness, was influential with some of these civil rights attorneys.70 It
denied the existence of mental illness, arguing that so-called mental
illnesses were simply arbitrarily defined categories of behavior.71
This view is no longer accepted in the mainstream today, but it had
an impact on some of the arguments made for patients’ civil rights.
One of the leaders among these civil rights attorneys, Bruce
Ennis—a recent law graduate having no previous experience with the
mentally ill, concluded that psychiatric hospitals were “places where
sick people get sicker and sane people go mad.”72 His goal was
therefore “nothing less than the abolition of involuntary
hospitalization” and the permanent closure of psychiatric hospitals.73
In testimony before a U.S. Senate subcommittee in 1969, he stated
that “[c]ommitment because of alleged danger to self or others
should require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, based on a recent
overt act or threat, that the person would, if at liberty, inflict
substantial physical injury upon himself or others within the
immediate future.”74 His articulation of this “dangerousness”
standard would have great influence on the emerging law for both
involuntary commitment and involuntary treatment standards.
Much of the civil litigation on the issue of involuntary
commitment and treatment occurred between the 1960s and the
1980s—at the same time that deinstitutionalization was emptying
psychiatric beds and closing psychiatric hospitals.75 Before the rise
of this litigation, it was common for courts to generally leave the
custody, care, and treatment of involuntarily committed mental
patients within the discretion of institutional authorities.76
Extremely influential cases from this period included
Lessard v. Schmidt,77 a case originating from a Wisconsin U.S.
District Court that provided procedural protections for involuntary
commitment, incorporated a least restrictive alternative requirement,
and found that the Constitution required the state to prove “that there
is an extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do
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immediate harm to himself or others.”78 Cases recognizing a
constitutional right to refuse treatment from this period included
Rennie v. Klein,79 Rogers v. Okin,80 Davis v. Hubbard,81 and
Bee v. Greaves.82 In analyzing the influence of these cases, one
scholar explained that they were
cited again and again not only during their progress to
finality but in the years after the final outcomes were
handed down. And, they are cited as much for the verbiage
and the rhetoric they employ as for their outcomes, if not
more so. In fact, the way the cases are used by advocates
and academic commentators alike suggests a heavy-on-theprocess, need-to-police-the-psychiatrists solidarity that fails
to reflect the substantial differences in the diagnoses of the
issue and the consequent remedies proposed or imposed by
the various courts.83
The U.S. Supreme Court has rarely directly considered the right
to refuse antipsychotic medications in any detail, although there are a
host of constitutional principles that advocates and commentators
have argued may come into play—including a liberty interest under
the Due Process Clause, freedom of speech and thought under the
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78. Id. at 1093.
79. 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (holding that a patient’s right to refuse
medication in the absence of an emergency stems from a constitutional right to privacy and
requiring some due process procedures in that context).
80. 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361, 1364–66 (D. Mass 1979) (reasoning that “although committed
mental patients do suffer at least some impairment of their relationship to reality, most are able to
appreciate the benefits, risks, and discomfort that may reasonably be expected from receiving
psychotropic medication.” The opinion refuses to define an emergency situation in broad
psychiatric terms. It also recognizes a constitutional right to refuse based both on privacy and the
First Amendment.) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom.,
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), Rogers v. Comm’r, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983).
81. 506 F. Supp. 915, 929 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (“[U]nlike some of the courts which have
derived the right to refuse treatment from the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, as well
as the ‘penumbras’ and ‘shadows’ of these and the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, this
Court believes the source of the right can best be understood as substantive due process, or
phrased differently, as an aspect of ‘liberty’ guaranteed by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
82. 744 F.2d 1387, 1394 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that “[g]iven the undisputed nature of
antipsychotic drugs, . . . a pretrial detainee retains a liberty interest derived from the Constitution
in avoiding unwanted medication with such drugs,” but that interest “must be balanced against
competing state interests to determine whether it is outweighed by the demands of an organized
society” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. Samuel Jan Brakel & John M. Davis, Overriding Mental Health Treatment Refusals:
How Much Process Is “Due”?, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 501, 531 (2008).
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MELTON et al., supra note 29, at 382–83.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 129 (1992).
Sell v. U.S., 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
Harper, 494 U.S. at 221–22.
Id. at 229–30.
Id. at 227.
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
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First Amendment, the right to avoid cruel and unusual punishment,
the Equal Protection Clause (because non-mentally ill patients may
generally refuse medical treatment), and the penumbral right to
privacy.84
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of the
right to refuse psychotropic medications when a state has no criminal
justice interest involved. But it has addressed such involuntary
treatment issues for a convicted prisoner,85 a detainee during trial,86
and a detainee for whom such medication may be required to
establish competency for a future trial “for serious, but nonviolent
crimes.”87
These cases all focused on involuntary treatment issues in the
criminal context but are not entirely relevant to the issue at hand,
because this Article addresses an appropriate involuntary treatment
standard regardless of whether the situation involves a criminal
justice issue. However, these cases have included relevant reasoning
that has influenced laws and legal argument regarding involuntary
treatment both within and outside a criminal justice context.
For example, Washington v. Harper recognized “a significant
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”88 In recognizing that liberty interest, the Court put
substantial emphasis on dangerous potential side effects of the
drugs.89 Harper required a finding of dangerousness and that it was
in an inmate’s medical interest to forcibly medicate,90 but it was
initially unclear how broadly this standard might apply outside a
prison context.
Riggins v. Nevada held that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
affords at least as much protection to persons the State detains for
trial” as it does for convicted prisoners as addressed in Harper.91
Riggins therefore required not only medical appropriateness and an
“overriding
justification”
(thus
characterizing
Harper’s
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Id.
See id. at 137.
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
Id. at 181–82.
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id. at 183.
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“dangerousness” standard as a subset of such justifications rather
than the standard in itself), but also a consideration of “less intrusive
alternatives.”92 While Riggins did not consider whether First
Amendment rights were involved, the court was clearly concerned
with
antipsychotic
medication’s
potential
effects
on
communication.93
Most recently, in Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that antipsychotic medications can be involuntarily administered to
render competency for trial if:
[1] a mentally ill defendant [2] [is] facing serious criminal
charges . . . [and] [3] the treatment is medically appropriate
[and] [4] is substantially unlikely to have side effects that
may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, [5] taking
account of less intrusive alternatives, [6] is necessary [to]
significantly . . . further important governmental trialrelated interests.94
The Court elaborated on the proper meaning and analysis of these
points in significant length and detail and then promptly proceeded to
discourage this test’s use.95 The Court explained that the test would
not be necessary if a reviewing court could base the order for forced
medication on a different purpose than simply competency for trial.96
As alternative purposes, the Court provided the example of Harper
with “purposes . . . related to the individual’s dangerousness, or
purposes related to the individual’s own interests where refusal to
take drugs puts his health gravely at risk.”97 The Court explicitly
stated that such alternative purposes (and thus alternative tests)
should be used “before turning to the trial competence question”98
and that authorizing medication on alternative grounds would make
any need to consider competency grounds “likely disappear.”99
Thus, relevant themes of recurring concern for the various courts
in these cases include liberty and privacy interests, medical
appropriateness, side effects of the medications (both in terms of

C M
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100. TORREY, supra note 69, at 123 (citing DG Langsley & JT Barter, Community Mental
Health in California, 122 W. J. MED. 271 (1975); SP Segal et al., Civil Commitment in the
Psychiatric Emergency Room, 45 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 753 (1988); PAUL S.
APPLEBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 28
(1994)).
101. Johnson & Condon, supra note 63.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Improved Treatment Standards, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., http://
www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/solution/improved-treatment-standards (last visited Sept. 21,
2013).
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3. Current State of Involuntary Treatment (and Related) Laws
State laws have developed both in response to cases, such as
those described above, and as a reaction to various events and
political pressures. For example,
[b]efore the Lessard decision, only nine states used
‘dangerousness’ as the sole criterion for involuntary
psychiatric hospitalization. By 1980, every state had
changed its statute to restrict hospitalization to persons who
were dangerous to themselves or others . . . or had
interpreted its preexisting statute in a way so as to save it
from being found unconstitutional.100
These laws “made it difficult—and illegal in some states—to force a
person into treatment unless he or she was homicidal or suicidal.”101
Responding to such standards, one physician, Dr. Darold Treffert,
collected stories of those that could not qualify for involuntary
treatment and later killed themselves—he coined the phrase “dying
with their rights on.”102
Today, “[t]he pendulum is slowly returning to a reasonable
balance,” Dr. Treffert observed in a 2012 Associated Press news
article.103 Currently, the vast majority of states allow intervention on
broader grounds than “dangerousness to self and others,” though a
small minority continues to require “dangerousness” as the sole basis
for intervention and ordering treatment.104
Standards vary among the states, but often another ground is
“grave disability,” which usually focuses on the person’s ability to
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105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Satel, supra note 3.
108. Id.
109. Lloyd I. Sederer, The Tragedy of Mental-Health Law, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324081704578234002322233718.html.
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meet basic survival needs.105 A significant number of states have also
added “need-for-treatment” provisions. Definitions of such
provisions again vary among the states, but might, for example,
allow intervention if it was necessary to prevent further psychiatric
deterioration.106 Arizona, which is among the more lenient states in
this area, allows any concerned party to petition the court for an
order of treatment. An evaluation and subsequent care may be
mandated if the person is found to be “persistently and acutely
disabled” by severe mental illness and “likely to benefit from
treatment.”107 Jared Loughner might have been prevented from
shooting former Representative Gabrielle Giffords, and killing and
wounding a host of others, had someone filed such a petition—
especially given his “worrisome track record—the number of times
the campus police were called to intervene; the pressing concerns of
his teacher and of other students; and the . . . fact that the college
would not readmit him after his suspension without psychiatric
clearance.”108
Civil commitment of a psychotic individual does not guarantee
the ability to get treatment. “Another court order [may be] necessary
for doctors to treat hospitalized patients against their will.”109 As
explained above, a court may consider whatever relevant grounds the
statutes of a state provide for determining whether medication may
be forcibly administered. Doctors (and a court) will also consider a
patient’s competency to make the medication decision, but as one
scholar explained, the test for such competency is usually remarkably
low.
Generally, tests for determining competency to make
medical treatment decisions require only that someone
possess the capacity to understand the potential advantages
and disadvantages of a proposed treatment. These tests aim
to minimize medical paternalism and promote individual
autonomy by finding that almost all people are competent to
make their own treatment decisions. And these tests do find
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110. Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks Care: Competency to Make Medical Treatment
Decisions and Parens Patriae Civil Commitments, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 562–63 (2012)
(emphasis added). See generally Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Psychotropic Medication:
Three Alternatives to the Law’s Cognitive Standard, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 689, 691–92 (1993)
(providing an in-depth discussion of competency).
111. Sederer, supra note 108.
112. See Tomas, supra note 10.
113. Assisted
Outpatient
Treatment
Laws,
TREATMENT
ADVOCACY
CTR.,
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/solution/assisted-outpatient-treatment-laws (last visited
Sept. 21, 2013) (“The five states that do not have AOT are Connecticut, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Tennessee.”). See Lori R. Holyfield, One Fell Through the
Cracks: Why Tennessee Needs an Initial Outpatient Commitment Statute, 42 U. MEM. L. REV.
221, 232 (2011); Bruce J. Winick et al., Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 94 (2003).
114. See Steven K. Erickson, Michael J. Vitacco & Gregory J. Van Rybroek, Beyond Overt
Violence: Wisconsin’s Progressive Civil Commitment Statute As A Marker of A New Era in
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almost all people competent, even people with severe
mental illnesses. Most people with severe mental illnesses,
including some people who are experiencing active
psychotic episodes, are not so impaired that they are
incapable of understanding a proposed medical treatment.
They might refuse treatment for their psychotic symptoms
on the basis of unlikely or even obviously false beliefs—
most often, the belief that they are not ill—but such beliefs
do not necessarily make them incapable of comprehending
the proposed treatment. The result is that many people who
are subject to civil commitment are competent to refuse
medical treatment.110
Privacy laws also frequently frustrate parents and family
members of severely mentally ill patients. “The 1996 federal law
known as HIPAA (the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act) is meant to protect the medical information of
individuals, but it has also come to limit what a doctor can say to a
patient’s family (with the exception of unemancipated minors).”111
This can inhibit educated family support, which research has shown
can greatly affect treatment outcomes.112
As of January 2013, forty-five states had Assisted Outpatient
Treatment laws (AOT).113 Such laws vary by state, but under certain
conditions (such as a history of frequent hospitalizations and/or
violence) they provide court-ordered treatment for severely mentally
ill patients who have a history of treatment noncompliance as a
condition of remaining in the community.114 In other words, if they
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choose not to take their medications, these severely mentally ill
patients may be civilly committed for a specified period of time.115
One of the most famous examples that spawned increased national
interest is Kendra’s Law of New York—named for a young woman
who died in 1999 after being pushed in front of a subway train by a
schizophrenic man with a history of violence who failed to take his
medication.116 New York was relatively late in adopting such a
statute,117 but many states had not (and some still do not) make
significant use of the AOT provisions they have adopted.118 Some
(but not all) studies have linked AOT programs with increased
participation in case management and reduced arrests,
hospitalizations, assaults, threats of violence, incarceration, and
homelessness.119
In the wake of the Newtown shootings, many lawmakers are
reconsidering mental health laws. Gun control laws in New York that
were passed in the aftermath of Newtown included a measure to
strengthen Kendra’s Law but, according to critics, “left big gaps in
the safety net that scream for closure.”120 In January 2013, the New
York Times reported that
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Mental Health Law, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 359, 384 (2005) (explaining some states also use
“predicted deterioration” statutes—these “states allow involuntary commitment to rest on a
prediction of future deterioration or relapse of mental illness, with only a portion of [those states]
requiring a further link to dangerousness.”). Paul P. Christopher & Debra A. Pinals Civil
Commitment Based on Predicted Deterioration, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 399, 401
(2009), available at http://www.jaapl.org/content/37/3/399.full.
115. See Assisted Outpatient Treatment Laws, supra note 112.
116. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among
Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 402 (2006); Ilissa L. Watnik, A
Constitutional Analysis of Kendra’s Law: New York’s Solution for Treatment of the Chronically
Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1181 (2001).
117. See Kathryn A. Worthington, Kendr’s Law and the Rights of the Mentally Ill: An
Empirical Peek Behind the Courts’ Legal Analysis and A Suggested Template for the New York
State Legislature’s Reconsideration for Renewal in 2010, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213,
224 (2009).
118. See Monahan, supra note 116 at 401–02; TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., MENTAL
HEALTH POLICY REFORMS TO REDUCE MASS SHOOTINGS (2013), available at http://
www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/proposalsformentalhealthpolicyreform.1.4
.12.pdf.
119. See Richard Glasgow, Forced Medication of Criminal Defendants and the Unintended
Consequences of Sell v. United States, 21 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 235, 253 (2005);
Satel, supra note 3.
120. Editorial, Halfway on Kendra’s Law, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 22, 2013,
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/halfway-kendra-law-article-1.1244483 (stating the new
amendments included provisions to extend the maximum term of forced treatment orders, create
statewide enforcement, and mandate the evaluation of state prison inmates being discharged from
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state-run psychiatric facilities). But the new provisions do not require evaluations of those
mentally ill housed in locally run jails, psychiatric wards in non-state hospitals, or those housed in
secure state-run psychiatric facilities who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity. See
id.
121. Erica Goode & Jack Healy, Focus on Mental Health Laws to Curb Violence is Unfair,
Some Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/us/focus-on-mentalhealth-laws-to-curb-violence-is-unfair-some-say.html?ref=mentalhealthanddisorders.
122. Id.
123. Brady Dennis & Paul Kane, Measure Would Strengthen Mental Health-care System,
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/measurewould-strengthen-mental-health-care-system/2013/02/07/dd64db44-714d-11e2-ac36
-3d8d9dcaa2e2_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines.
124. Goode & Healey, supra note 121.
125. See id.; Benedict Carey & Anemona Hartocollis, Warning Signs of Violent Acts Often
Unclear, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/health/breaking-link-of
-violence-and-mental-illness.html?ref=mentalhealthanddisorders.
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Legislation to revise existing mental health laws is under
consideration in at least a half-dozen states . . . . A New
York bill requiring mental health practitioners to warn the
authorities about potentially dangerous patients was signed
into law on [January 15, 2013]. In Washington, President
Obama has ordered “a national dialogue” on mental health,
and a variety of bills addressing mental health issues are
percolating on Capitol Hill.121
The proposals being considered across the nation “include
strengthening mental health services, lowering the threshold for
involuntary commitment and increasing requirements for reporting
worrisome patients to the authorities.”122 In February 2013, a
bipartisan group of senators, citing renewed urgency due to the
Newtown shootings, introduced legislation that “would put in place
standards for about 2,000 ‘federally qualified’ community behavioral
health centers, requiring them to provide such services as substance
abuse treatment and 24-hour crisis care” in return for being able to
bill Medicaid for their services.123 This, of course, is different from
but reminiscent of President John F. Kennedy’s original plan.
Thus, the law is currently in a state of great flux. Newtown has
caused a long overdue reassessment of a system that is “fragmented
and drastically inadequate.”124 But while mental health advocates
find some of the proposals appealing, others are troublesome—
particularly the reporting requirements that might discourage patients
from seeking care or providing full disclosure to physicians.125 The
emphasis of the reforms seems to be on prevention of violence and
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access to services—which is laudable, but not sufficient. The lack of
resources for mental health treatment has been a tremendous
problem, but leading a person to water is only the first step in
quenching thirst. What if the person refuses to drink? The next
section examines the current science and its implications for that
question.
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126. Eddy Nahmias, Is Neuroscience the Death of Free Will?, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR
(Nov. 13, 2007, 5:25 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/is-neuroscience-the
-death-of-free-will/.
127. See DAVID EAGLEMAN, INCOGNITO: THE SECRET LIVES OF THE BRAIN 1–2 (2011).
128. Rene Marois & Jason Ivanoff, Capacity Limits of Information Processing in the Brain, 9
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 296, 296 (2005), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com
/science/article/pii/S1364661305001178.
129. Charlie Rose: The Mentally Ill Brain (television broadcast June 22, 2010), available at
http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/11078.
130. Editorial, supra note 8.
131. Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but Treatment,
56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1137 (2008).
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III. INSIGHTS FROM SCIENCE
Human brains are “the most complexly organized things in the
known universe.”126 A single cubic millimeter of brain tissue
contains approximately one hundred million synaptic connections
between neurons, and a cubic centimeter has as many synaptic
connections as there are stars in the Milky Way galaxy.127 The
brain’s “hundred billion neurons and several hundred trillion
synaptic connections can process and exchange prodigious amounts
of information over a distributed neural network in the matter of
milliseconds.”128 Dr. Eric Kandel, a Nobel Prize winning
neuroscientist and professor at Columbia University, asserts that
severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, are the most
complicated illnesses in all of medicine, because they not only
involve the body’s most complex organ, but also the most complex
functions of that organ.129
Why did Nature, the premiere science journal, assert that this is
“[a] decade for psychiatric disorders,” and that there are “many ways
in which the understanding and treatment of conditions such as
schizophrenia are ripe for a revolution”?130 The reasons include the
tremendous pace of scientific advances that are providing new
insight into the nature of severe mental illnesses like schizophrenia.
Indeed, knowledge of the human brain is expanding exponentially.131
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132. Editorial, supra note 8.
133. For example, Eric Kandel, a Nobel Prize-winning neuroscientist, predicted that just as
the gene was the target of biological sciences in the second half of the 20th century, the new
technologies allowing unprecedented study of the brain will make it the main focus of the
biological sciences for the 21st century. Charlie Rose: The Great Mysteries of the Human Brain,
(television broadcast Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview
/10694. Hank Greely, Director for the Center of Law and Biosciences at Stanford University, also
said that “neuroscience is going to be the most fascinating science of this coming century . . . and
it’s going to be the most socially important.” Stanford’s Hank Greely on Research Advances vs.
Social Challenges, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.nimh.nih.gov
/news/media/video/stanfords-hank-greely-on-research-advances-vs-social-challenges.shtml.
134. See John Markoff, Obama Seeking to Boost Study of Human Brain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/science/project-seeks-to-build-map-of-human-brain
.html?_r=0.
135. Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the Emerging
Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 357 (2010).
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New techniques such as genome-wide association studies,
sophisticated brain imaging, and optical manipulation of neural
circuits provide opportunities to discover the neural circuitry
underlying cognitive dysfunction and to develop better prediction,
treatment, and prevention options.132 Indeed, these exciting new
technologies that allow for unprecedented insight into the brain,
coupled with the brain’s incredible complexity, have led prominent
scholars to label this not just the decade of psychiatric disorders, but
also the century of the brain.133 This claim was further supported by
the 2013 State of the Union announcement of a new decade-long
government funded effort to map the active human brain.134
The purpose of this section is to examine this developing science
regarding schizophrenia and to consider the implications for issues
surrounding the involuntary treatment debate. In doing so, this
Article falls within a relatively new field of research that draws
connections between neuroscience and law. The growth of
scholarship in this field that some call “neurolaw” has been
astounding—a survey in 2009 found “a 300 [percent] increase over
the number [of related scholarly articles] published just five years
earlier, and . . . a 2,000 [percent] increase over the number published
a decade before.”135
Despite the explosive growth of neurolaw literature, the
scholarship has not included a broad-based and in-depth analysis of
the relation of recent progress in the brain sciences to the involuntary
treatment of the severely mentally ill. Very few articles have touched
on some of these issues, but with a significantly narrower or simply

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 145 Side B

09/23/2014 13:40:53

RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC?

278

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

9/1/2014 6:48 PM

[Vol. 47:251

different focus.136 This Article fills that gap by examining recent
scientific advances in the study of the brain and mental illness and
how those advances should illuminate the thorny issue of when to
forcibly medicate a patient who is severely mentally ill. The Article
focuses on schizophrenia as an example of “one of the most complex
of all mental health disorders.”137
A. Schizophrenia—the Nature and Symptoms of the Disease
Schizophrenia is a severe brain disorder that affects
approximately 1 percent of Americans138 and twenty-four million
people worldwide.139 It is a chronic and often disabling condition
with no known cure, but treatment may relieve the patient of many
symptoms.140 Generally schizophrenia manifests itself with paranoid
delusions and auditory hallucinations either in late adolescence or
early adulthood, “with a peak between ages [eighteen and twentyfive], when the prefrontal cortex [an area of the brain] is still
developing.”141 But there is evidence that it is a neurodevelopmental
disorder and that psychosis is “a late, potentially preventable stage of
the illness.”142
Schizophrenia’s effects vary widely, and relapse and remission
cycles are common.143 The symptoms of schizophrenia are
categorized as positive, negative, and cognitive. Positive symptoms
are psychotic behaviors that can wax and wane. They include
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136. See, e.g., Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo’s Nest: Why Do Courts
Continue to Rely on Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 987 (2002); Rodney
J.S. Deaton, Neuroscience and the In Corpore-Ted First Amendment, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
181 (2006); Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the “Chemical Straitjacket”: The Legal Significance
of Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033
(2002); Rachel A. Scherer, Toward A Twenty-First Century Civil Commitment Statute: A Legal,
Medical, and Policy Analysis of Preventive Outpatient Treatment, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 361,
362 (2007).
137. Schizophrenia, JOHN HOPKINS MED. HEALTH LIBR., http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org
/healthlibrary/conditions/mental_health_disorders/schizophrenia_85,P00762/
(last
visited
Sept. 21, 2013).
138. NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 5.
139. Schizophrenia, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mental_health/management
/schizophrenia/en/index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
140. See NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 1.
141. Thomas Insel, Rethinking Schizophrenia, 468 NATURE 187, 188 (2010), available at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v468/n7321/full/nature09552.html.
142. Id. at 187.
143. Frequently Asked Questions about Schizophrenia, BRAIN & BEHAV. RES. FOUND., http://
bbrfoundation.org/frequently-asked-questions-about-schizophrenia (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
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144. NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 3.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Editorial, Combating Schizophrenia, 468 NATURE 133, 133 (2010), available at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v468/n7321/full/468133a.html.
148. NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 5.
149. Elizabeth Walsh et al., Violence and Schizophrenia: Examining the Evidence, 180 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 490, 490–95 (2002).
150. Thomas Insel, Director’s Blog: Understanding Severe Mental Illness, NAT’L INST.
MENTAL HEALTH (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2011/understandingsevere-mental-illness.shtml. The severely mentally ill are far more often the victims rather than
perpetrators of violence—they are “11 times more likely to be victims of violent crime than the
general population.” Id.
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hallucinations (these may involve any of the senses but are most
often voices), delusions (non-cultural false beliefs that do not yield to
logic and are often bizarre—examples include believing thoughts can
kill others, that neighbors are controlling one’s own behavior through
magnetic waves, radio stations are broadcasting one’s thoughts to
others, or paranoid delusions that others are conspiring harm),
thought disorders (often manifested in trouble organizing or
connecting thoughts logically and may result in garbled speech), and
movement disorders (sometimes manifested in performing certain
repeated motions or becoming catatonic).144
Negative symptoms involve loss of function in areas such as
emotion and motivation. They include flat affect (lack of facial
expression), talking in a flat voice, lack of ability to feel pleasure or
begin and sustain planned activities, and social withdrawal.145
Cognitive symptoms include poor executive functioning,
working memory, focus, or attention. Cognitive symptoms can be
severely disabling of efforts to lead a normal life.146 “Violence is not
a symptom of schizophrenia—only a tiny proportion of sufferers
with the condition are homicidal.”147 People with the disease are
generally not violent.148 However, there is increased risk as
compared to the general population, and factors that some claim
markedly increase the risk of violence include substance abuse and
acute psychotic symptoms.149 “Research has suggested that those
with schizophrenia whose psychotic symptoms are controlled are no
more violent than those without [severe mental illness]. It’s likely
that treatment not only helps ease the symptoms of mental illness,
but also curbs the potential for violence as well.”150 While the risk of
being a victim of violence from a person with schizophrenia is very
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151. NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 5.
152. Editorial, supra note 8, at 9; NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 6.
153. Frankie H.F. Lee et al., Disc1 Point Mutations in Mice Affect Development of the
Cerebral Cortex, 31 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3197–206 (Mar. 2011), available at
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/31/9/3197.full?sid=fbe768b6-e3b7-48bb-82e3-47237bc5e68c.
154. New Research to Identify and Treat Schizophrenia Early, N.Y. PRESBYTERIAN HOSP.,
COLUM. U. (Apr. 27, 2010), http://nyp.org/advances/new-research-treat-schizophrenia-early.html.
155. Philip J. Benson et al., Simple Viewing Tests Can Detect Eye Movement Abnormalities
That Distinguish Schizophrenia Cases from Controls with Exceptional Accuracy, 72 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHIATRY 716, 716 (2012).
156. See Frequently Asked Questions about Schizophrenia, supra note 142.
157. New Research to Identify and Treat Schizophrenia Early, supra note 153.
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small, people with the illness commit suicide at a much higher rate
than the general population. Approximately 10 percent of patients die
by suicide—most of them young adult males.151
Studies of brains of schizophrenic patients have shown a number
of differences from those of the general population—including
altered function of certain neurotransmitters, decreased white and
gray brain matter, enlarged ventricles,152 “reduced hippocampal and
cortical volume, abnormal cytoarchitecture, reduced neuronal density
in superficial cortical layers, decreased neuron size, and reduced
dendritic abortization and dendritic spine density.”153
While these differences have been documented at population
levels, there are currently no tests to diagnose schizophrenia in an
individual.154 However, there are promising studies that suggest such
tests may be available in the future. For example, a recent study was
able to distinguish between mentally healthy and schizophrenic
individuals with 98.3 percent accuracy by using a series of tests that
detected eye-movement abnormalities associated with the disorder
that were independent of mental state at the time of testing.155
Until such methods can be further verified and perfected,
diagnoses today are made by monitoring symptoms over a period of
time.156 Scientists are currently searching for biomarkers that might
aid not only with diagnosis but lead to more insight regarding what is
causing the disease. For example, researchers found that among a
group of young people identified as at risk for the disease, a subfield
of the hippocampus was abnormally active in those that did develop
schizophrenia.157
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158. Insel, supra note 140, at 187.
159. NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 6.
160. Id.
161. Philip Seeman, All Roads to Schizophrenia Lead to Dopamine Supersensitivity and
Elevated Dopamine D2High Receptors, 17 CNS NEUROSCIENCE & THERAPEUTICS 118–32 (Apr.
2011), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1755-5949.2010.00162.x/full.
162. John McGrath et al., Prevention and Schizophrenia—The Role of Dietary Factors, 37
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 272–83 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc
/articles/PMC3044637/.
163. Seeman, supra note 160, at 118.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 118–19.
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1. Mysterious Causes
“After a century of studying schizophrenia, the cause of the
disorder remains unknown.”158 However, there is evidence that
genetic, environmental, and experiential factors play a part in who
develops the disease.
While only 1 percent of the population develops schizophrenia,
it occurs in 10 percent of those with a first-generation relative who
suffers from the disease—and the odds increase to 40 to 65 percent
for an identical twin.159 Scientists believe no single gene causes the
disease on its own.160 “Genetic risk factors are numerous, with 50 to
100 gene mutations and variations reported each year as associated
with schizophrenia.”161
Studies of babies born during a famine (both the Dutch Hunger
Winter of World War II and the Chinese famine from 1959–61)
show that they had double the chance of developing schizophrenia
due to malnutrition in the womb.162 Other “[n]ongenetic risk factors
include [but are not limited to] infection during fetal life, brain
injury, an anoxia at birth, trauma in childhood, abuse of street drugs
and steroids, brain lesions, psychosocial stress, isolation, smoking,
and excess coffee.”163
Determining the precise causal factors is difficult, because “the
signs and symptoms are the same, regardless of the cause. They are
the same whether one has had a brain injury and developed
schizophrenia, or whether one has smoked too much cannabis and
developed schizophrenia.”164 This similarity in symptoms has been
assumed to suggest a common molecular pathway for the disease,165
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but a very recent study questions whether there is some variation on
that front among at least a minority of schizophrenic patients.166
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166. “Our findings suggest that there may be a different molecular mechanism leading to
schizophrenia in patients who do not respond to anti-psychotic medication. Identifying the precise
molecular pathway particularly in these patients is of utmost importance and will help inform the
development of much-needed novel treatments.” Research May Explain Why Some People With
Schizophrenia Do Not Respond to Treatment, MEDICAL XPRESS (Nov. 29, 2012), http://
medicalxpress.com/news/2012-11-people-schizophrenia-treatment.html#jCp
(citing
Arisme
Demjaha et al., Dopamine Synthesis Capacity in Patients with Treatment-Resistant
Schizophrenia, 169 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1203 (Nov. 2012)), available at http://
ajp.psychiatryonline.org/article.aspx?articleid=1377137).
167. McGlashan, supra note 12, at 902.
168. Id.
169. See NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 11–13.
170. Id.
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2. Treatments for Schizophrenia
Because there is no known cure, treatment for schizophrenia
focuses on managing its symptoms. Currently available drugs can
serve to quiet the positive symptoms of psychosis (for most, though
not all, patients) but “fail[] to reverse the development of deficits in
brain capacity that are most prominently expressed as the negative
symptoms and cognition impairments.”167 Patients may therefore
“remain disabled and dysfunctional from deficits in capacities for
feeling, thinking, working, and caring.”168
Drugs alone, therefore, are generally essential but not sufficient
for optimal treatment of schizophrenia. Experts recommend that
patients also undergo regular psychosocial treatment of various
kinds.169 Patients who do regularly receive such treatment are more
likely to continue taking their medications and are less likely to
relapse or be hospitalized.170
Professor Elyn Saks has explained that therapy helps patients on
numerous levels, including with the ability to (1) identify, cope with,
or avoid stressors; (2) develop psychological mindedness (by which
she means stronger observational skills for analyzing what is going
on in one’s own mind, and thus increased ability to have healthier
reactions to it); and (3) come to terms with the tremendous blow to
self-esteem that often accompanies patients’ recognition of their
severe mental illness. Indeed, Elyn Saks believes that had she
received either drugs without therapy or therapy without drugs, her
original prognosis that she would never be able to live independently
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(let alone become a distinguished, award-winning professor) would
have been correct.171
As discussed in further detail below, there are serious limitations
and risks associated with presently available medications,
complicating the issue of when it might be appropriate to forcibly
medicate the severely mentally ill. This Article examines some of the
current research on potential new treatments—but regarding medical
treatments for the psychotic symptoms, “[f]rustratingly, the
effectiveness of medications has stalled.”172 Over the more-than-half
century these medications have been available, they have advanced
predominantly “not in their efficacy but in a reduction [though not an
elimination] of their debilitating side effects.”173
The sections that follow examine scientific research regarding
the vital importance of early medical intervention for long-term
prognosis, the serious side effects of medications, and the effects that
changes in the brain can cause in behavior and personality—and how
all these factors do (or ought to) influence the involuntary treatment
debate.

C M
Y K

09/23/2014 13:40:53

171. Charlie Rose: The Mentally Ill Brain, supra note 129.
172. Editorial, supra note 8, at 9.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Mark Taylor et al., Advances in the Understanding and Challenges Facing the
Management of First-Episode Schizophrenia, 26 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 3, 3–5 (May 2012),
available at http://jop.sagepub.com/content/26/5_suppl/3.full#ref-8.
175. Christopher Slobogin, Sell’s Conundrums: The Right of Incompetent Defendants to
Refuse Anti-Psychotic Medication, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1523, 1530 n.43 (2012) (citing Max
Marshall et al., Association Between Duration of Untreated Psychosis and Outcome in Cohorts of
“First-Episode” Patients: A Systematic Review, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 975 (2005));
see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
309 (4th ed. 2000) (explaining that “treatment with antipsychotic medication soon after the onset
of the illness” is associated with a better prognosis); MARVIN I. HERZ & STEPHEN R. MARDER,
SCHIZOPHRENIA: COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 152 (2002) (“[P]rolonged
psychotic episodes may be associated with enduring damage”); JEFFREY A. LIEBERMAN ET AL.,
TEXTBOOK OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 356 (2006) (“[M]eta-analysis of 42 research reports from 28
studies found that shorter duration of untreated psychosis was associated with greater response to
antipsychotic treatment, including improvement in severity of global psychopathology, positive
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B. The Medical Significance of Early Treatment
Extensive research shows that for a psychotic illness like
schizophrenia, “early identification . . . is paramount and can affect
long-term outcome.”174 Indeed, “[t]he longer the duration between
the onset of serious psychosis and treatment, the more likely longterm disability will result.”175
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symptoms, negative symptoms, and functional outcomes.”) (citations omitted); see also Klein,
supra note 64, at 394 n.175 (“Early treatment is most likely to be effective.”).
176. Earlier Diagnosis of Schizophrenia Improves Results of Treatment, YALE SCH. OF MED.
(Feb. 26, 2004), http://medicine.yale.edu/news/article.aspx?id=3456 (quoting Thomas H.
McGlashan).
177. Thomas H. McGlashan, Schizophrenia in Translation: Is Active Psychosis Neurotoxic?,
32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 609, 611–13 (2006), available at http://schizophreniabulletin
.oxfordjournals.org/content/32/4/609.full.
178. Taylor et al., supra note 173, at 3.
179. New Research to Identify and Treat Schizophrenia Early, supra note 154.
180. Id.
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Thomas McGlashan, a now emeritus professor of psychiatry at
Yale School of Medicine, explained that from a study he conducted
of 281 Scandinavian patients, there are indications that an untreated
psychotic state is itself dangerous to one’s long-term prognosis. “It
looks like the longer the period of time before treatment, the worse
off the patients are not only when they come into treatment, but how
they respond to treatment.”176 He explained:
Acutely active psychosis is a dangerous mental state, if not
a medical emergency, because of its aberrant experiences,
loss of insight, and distortions of judgment. It requires
immediate treatment, including antipsychotic medication, to
reduce the danger of such distortions to life and social
network. The threat of chronically active psychosis is time
rather than mortality and stigma, time immersed in the
negative symptoms or cognitive distortions of disorder. If
prolonged, it may well create deficits that add to severity
beyond the level ultimately determined by the original brain
pathophysiology.177
Evidence suggests that “schizophrenia is a progressive brain
disease.”178 Brain scans show schizophrenia causing loss of grey
matter—reflecting the (at least presently) irreversible destruction of
neural synapses.179 Jeffrey Lieberman, Professor of Psychiatry at
Columbia University, explains that “[t]he whole thrust of early
intervention is to prevent this loss from occurring.”180
Because of the evidence regarding the importance of early
intervention for long-term prognosis, the National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH) has funded a research project that is presently
ongoing to try to develop effective methods of early intervention.
The project, known as Recovery After an Initial Schizophrenic
Episode (RAISE), involves two independent research teams,
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community clinics across the nation, and treatment models that
“focus on intervening as soon as possible after the first episode of
schizophrenia . . . . [and] integrate[] medication, psychosocial
therapies, family involvement, rehabilitation services, and supported
employment, all aimed at promoting symptom reduction and
improving life functioning.”181
Thus, early treatment is linked not only with better outcomes,
but better response to medications and less irreversible damage to the
brain. This evidence suggests that the early period of the disease is
critical, and patient welfare interests weigh most strongly in favor of
medical intervention during those early years. The same evidence
would also support long-term autonomy interests in early
intervention in that the patient’s mental abilities will be better
preserved and thus allow for a fuller range of personal possibilities
and choices in the future.

C M
Y K

09/23/2014 13:40:53

181. Recovery After an Initial Schizophrenia Episode (RAISE): A Research Project of the
NIMH, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/schizophrenia
/raise/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
182. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (emphasis added). The dissent
argued that the liberty interest was not only important because of potential side effects of the
drugs, but also because any “violation of a person’s bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her
liberty” and “is degrading if it overrides a competent person’s choice to reject a specific form of
medical treatment.” Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part). But neither dissent
nor majority would argue against the proposition that an invasion of liberty is “particularly
intrusive if it creates a substantial risk of death or injury.” See id.
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C. Safety and Effectiveness of Proposed Treatments
In Harper, the Supreme Court focused heavily on the serious
side effects that were possible from antipsychotic drugs in
determining that there was “no doubt that . . . [Mr. Harper]
possesse[d] a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”182
The side effects that concerned the Harper court included “acute
dystonia, a severe involuntary spasm of the upper body, tongue,
throat or eyes” (though the trial court found this condition could be
detected and remedied within minutes by taking the medication
Cogentin); “akathesia (motor restlessness, often characterized by an
inability to sit still), neuroleptic malignant syndrome (a relatively
rare condition which can lead to death from cardiac dysfunction),
and tardive dyskinesia,” a potentially irreversible neurological
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disorder “that is characterized by involuntary, uncontrollable
movements of various muscles, especially around the face.”183 The
Court acknowledged that there was conflicting evidence regarding
the frequency, severity, and reversibility of the tardive dyskinesia
side effect, but declared that “[a] fair reading of the evidence”
suggested that 10 percent to 25 percent of patients receiving
antipsychotic medications exhibited its symptoms—60 percent of
those that exhibited the symptoms had only “mild or minimal”
effects and 10 percent had severe symptoms.184
Harper was decided in 1990 and therefore did not focus on the
atypical or second-generation antipsychotic medications, the first of
which started to become broadly available in roughly the same time
period.185 These drugs are generally less likely to have the
neurological side effects of the first-generation options.186 There is
especially decreased risk for the side effects of tardive dyskinesia
and neuroleptic malignant syndrome.187
However, these second-generation drugs continue to carry
substantial risk of serious negative side effects.188 Depending on the

09/23/2014 13:40:53
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183. Id. at 229–30 (majority opinion).
184. Id. at 230.
185. Douglas Mossman & Jill L. Steinberg, Promoting, Prescribing, and Pushing Pills:
Understanding the Lessons of Antipsychotic Drug Litigation, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 263,
279 (2009).
186. MELTON ET AL., supra note 29, at 382; Richard A. Friedman, A Call for Caution on
Antipsychotic Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/health/a
-call-for-caution-in-the-use-of-antipsychotic-drugs.html?_r=0. At least one recent study has
called into question whether second-generation drugs really do have clinically significant
differences in extrapyramidal side effects, but that study’s methods of analysis and conclusions
have been criticized. See Henk S. Temmingh, Extrapyramidal Side-Effects and Antipsychotics:
Are Second-Generation Agents Still Indicated?, 201 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 247, 247 (2012),
available at http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/201/3/247.1.short. The article criticized is Michael J.
Peluso et al., Extrapyramidal Motor Side-Effects of First- and Second-Generation Antipsychotic
Drugs, 200 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 387 (Mar. 22, 2012), available at http://
bjp.rcpsych.org/content/200/5/387.fall. Another recent study confirms that second-generation
antipsychotics offer an extrapyramidal side effects advantage over first-generation drugs in first
episode psychosis. See Peter M Haddad et al., Antipsychotic Drugs and Extrapyramidal Side
Effects in First Episode Psychosis: A Systemic Review of Head-Head Comparisons,
26 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 15, 24–25 (May 2012), available at http://jop.sagepub.com
/content/26/5_suppl/15.short.
187. MELTON ET AL., supra note 29 at 382; Friedman, supra note 186.
188. See Christopher Slobogin, supra note 175, at 1542 (“The drugs used to treat psychosis—
including the so-called second-generation atypicals—all can have serious side effects, are
frequently administered in unnecessarily large doses or are not good drugs for the particular
person being treated, and are ineffective for anywhere from a quarter to a third of those to whom
they are administered.”) (citing RICHARD P. BENTALL, DOCTORING THE MIND: IS OUR CURRENT
TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS REALLY ANY GOOD? 222–24 (2009)).
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189. MELTON ET AL., supra note 29, at 382.
190. Unbuckling the “Chemical Straitjacket,” supra note 136, at 1070–71.
191. Id. at 1071.
192. Gary Stix, The Grand Challenge of Schizophrenia Drugs, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
(Sept. 21, 2012), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/talking-back/2012/09/21/the-grandchallenge-of-schizophrenia-drugs/ (summarizing the findings of Steve Hyman, former Harvard
provost and director of the National Institute of Mental Health).
193. See Questions and Answers About the NIMH Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of
Intervention Effectiveness Study (CATIE)—Phase 2 Results, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH
(Apr. 1, 2006), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/trials/practical/catie/phase2results.shtml.
194. Mossman, supra note 136, at 1071–73.
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specific drug prescribed and the body chemistry of the individual
patient, these side effects may include increased blood sugar,
elevated lipids and cholesterol, weight gain, diabetes, diminished
sexual desire, digestion problems, dizziness, drowsiness, anxiety,
insomnia, rapid heart rate, and agitation.189 Patients taking clozapine
(one of the second-generation drugs) also have a small risk of
developing agranulocytosis, which is potentially fatal.190 Patients
using clozapine must therefore be monitored by frequent blood
tests—especially in the first six months of treatment when
development of agranulocytosis is most likely.191 Second-generation
drugs are generally “less effective than they could be because over
time, they turn off a gene that helps reduce symptoms of
psychosis.”192
Only clozapine has been shown to be significantly more
effective in controlling psychotic symptoms than other first- or
second-generation antipsychotic drugs.193 But because of a variety of
factors, including the cost and inconvenience of frequent blood tests,
FDA restrictions, and medical risks, the drug is generally prescribed
only as a final resort when other antipsychotics have proven
ineffective for the patient.194
Dr. Herbert Meltzer, a prominent expert on antipsychotic
medications at Northwestern University, has explained that currently
approximately 70 percent of schizophrenics can be successfully
treated with antipsychotic medications other than clozapine. Of the
30 percent untreatable by those drugs, another approximate 70
percent can be successfully treated by clozapine. Clozapine also
reduces the risk of suicide for schizophrenic patients by

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 150 Side B

09/23/2014 13:40:53

RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC?

288

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

9/1/2014 6:48 PM

[Vol. 47:251

C M
Y K

09/23/2014 13:40:53

195. Herbert Meltzer, Address at Psychotropic Medication and the Law Symposium at The
Saks Institute for Mental Health Law, Policy, and Ethics: Development and Utilization of Drugs
for Treating Psychotic Disorders (Mar. 22, 2012), video available at http://weblaw.usc.edu
/centers/saks/psychotropic_medication.cfm.
196. See Francis J. McMahon & Thomas R. Insel, Pharmacogenomics and Personalized
Medicine in Neuropsychiatry, 74 NEURON 773, 773–76 (June 2012), available at http://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089662731200431X.
197. Genetic Link to Rapid Weight Gain from Antipsychotics Discovered, THE CENTRE FOR
ADDICTION AND MENTAL HEALTH (CAMH) (July 17, 2012), http://www.camh.ca/en/hospital
/about_camh/newsroom/news_releases_media_advisories_and_backgrounders/current_year/Page
s/Genetic-link-to-rapid-weight-gain-from-antipsychotics-discovered.aspx. The studies published
were: Malhotra AK et al., Association Between Common Variants Near the Melanocortin 4
Receptor Gene and Severe Antipsychotic Drug-Induced Weight Gain, 69 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY, 904, 904–12 (Sept. 2012); NI Chowdhury et al., Genetic Association Study
Between Antipsychotic-Induced Weight Gain and the Melanocortin-4 Receptor Gene,
PHARMACOGENOMICS J. (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.nature.com/tpj/journal/vaop
/ncurrent/full/tpj201166a.html.
198. Genetic Link to Rapid Weight Gain from Antipsychotics Discovered , supra note 197.
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approximately 80 percent but can be lethal to roughly one in ten
thousand patients.195
Thus, medications are unquestionably effective for the large
majority of patients—but it may take some trial and error to discover
which drug is the best match for which patient. And for a small
minority, no drug will effectively treat psychosis. For the latter
group, clearly patient welfare cannot trump the autonomy concerns.
Unfortunately, however, there is currently no way to know who falls
in that small minority before experimenting with different drugs for
the patient.
Indeed, scientific studies have made it increasingly clear that
both side effects and probable consequences of refusing treatment
are highly variable depending on the individual and the drugs
involved.196 Thus in determining whether drugs are in a
schizophrenic person’s best interest or are “medically appropriate,”
an individualized assessment, including a patient’s medical history
and consideration of past reactions to specific drugs, is necessary.
In the near future, it may also be possible to do some relevant
genetic analysis. For example, two studies published in 2012 found
“two genetic variants associated with the substantial, rapid weight
gain occurring in nearly half the patients treated with antipsychotic
medications.”197 “These results could eventually be used to identify
which patients have the variations, enabling clinicians to choose
strategies to prevent this serious side effect and offer more
personalized treatment.”198
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199. Philip R. Szesko, Magnetic Resonance Imaging Predictors of Treatment Response in
First-Episode Schizophrenia, 38 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 569, 569 (Nov. 2010), available at
http://schizophreniabulletin.oxfordjournals.org/content/38/3/569.short.
200. Jari Tiihonen et al., 11-Year Follow-Up of Mortality in Patients with Schizophrenia: A
Population-Based Cohort Study (FIN11 Study), 374 THE LANCET 620, 620 (Aug. 22, 2009),
available
at
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(09)60742-X
/abstract (emphasis added); see also Meltzer, supra note 194 (discussing the Tiihonen article).
201. See Tiihonen et al., supra note 200, at 620; Meltzer, supra note 195.
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Another study aimed at developing means to assist in the
prediction of a patient’s response to antipsychotic drugs examined
magnetic resonance (MR) imaging of patients’ brain structure. The
study concluded that among patients suffering a first-episode of
schizophrenia, those that responded well to the tested antipsychotics
had greater cortical thickness and asymmetry in certain regions of the
brain. These “findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
plasticity and cortical thickness may be more preserved in responders
and that MR imaging may assist in the prediction of antipsychotic
drug response in patients experiencing a first-episode of
schizophrenia.”199
For the time being, however, finding the appropriate drug for a
patient generally remains a trial-and-error process that can subject
the patient to highly undesirable and dangerous side effects. But in
weighing patient welfare interests in light of those side effects, one
must also consider the alternative—full-blown psychosis—and likely
consequences in its wake. A recent study shows that for the large
majority of schizophrenic patients, the effects of no medication are a
greater mortal danger to health than the side effects patients may
understandably wish to avoid.
That study was conducted by one of the world’s leading
epidemiologists, Professor Jari Tiihonen, MD. Published in 2009, the
study examined mortality rates of 66,881 schizophrenic patients. The
study concluded that “[l]ong-term cumulative exposure (7–11 years)
to any antipsychotic treatment was associated with lower mortality
than was no drug use.”200 Therefore, the greatest risk of premature
death for a schizophrenic patient was not from side effects of
antipsychotic medications, but from choosing to refrain from any
antipsychotic medication.201
Thus, although there has not been much progress in developing
new drugs in the last several decades (and further research in that
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area is sorely needed),202 there has been progress in research
regarding which individuals may be more or less susceptible to the
side effects of those drugs that are currently available and the
potential consequences of refusing medication altogether. As Justice
Kennedy predicted, “[t]he state of our knowledge of antipsychotic
drugs and their side effects is evolving,”203 and the legal community
should adjust its analysis as scientific developments surface. For
now, that would include a highly individualized analysis of a
patient’s likely response to specified medications (and the likely
consequence of abstaining) when determining if medication is in the
patient’s best medical interest—and thus how heavily the patient
welfare interest should weigh in the balance. Although presently that
analysis is generally a question of medical history, the science
suggests that, in the future, there will be other types of analyses that
will be available to better predict a particular patient’s response to
specific drugs. While it would seem that generally patient welfare
would weigh in favor of any patient with severe symptoms of
schizophrenia being subject to medication, that may not be true in
cases where all available drugs have proved fruitless or where
biomarkers might predict particularly severe responses to the
available drugs.
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202. “Medication development for mental disorders has stalled over the past three
decades. . . . Recently, many major pharmaceutical companies have all but abandoned drug
discovery efforts for mental illness.” McMahon & Insel, supra note 196, at 773.
203. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 145 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
204. For a greater discussion of theories of autonomy, see supra Part II.B.
205. The differences between the sick self and the healthy self may be more of a shifting
spectrum than a true dichotomy.
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D. Personhood
If autonomy is concerned with protecting the rights and
freedoms of the individual person, we must have some concept of
what “personhood” is.204 Mental illness can confuse the personhood
issue because the sick self and the healthy self may be at odds in
various ways and in ways that are not always easy to determine.205
Professor Elyn Saks explains that “it is hard to say when a new self
has come into being (rather than simply being a changed self) and
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when the new self has become the true self or is simply a temporary
aberration.”206 She concludes:
Surely a self that is unimpaired is in some sense “better”
than a self that is impaired. It has more skills and more
options. Impairments are limitations, and, all else being
equal, it is better not to suffer limitations. Value choices are
problematic in some ways, but some value choices seem so
right and good that we should feel fine about making
them.207
If we accept the healthy self as the true self (a proposition most
would probably accept if applying a Rawlsian veil),208 then
autonomy interests weigh in favor of protecting that self’s choices
over the impaired self’s choices when the two are in conflict. If the
healthy self would welcome treatment but the sick self would not,
autonomy would weigh in favor of forcing treatment—not only
because it honors the true self’s desires but also because it opens
options for the individual. The healthy self has far more ability to
function and prosper than the self that is allowed to remain
psychotic. However, determining the absent healthy self’s true
desires may be no easy matter. This section explores the science
behind various conditions that may cause the impaired self to express
different desires than the healthy self.
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206. SAKS, supra note 48, at 204.
207. Id. at 204–05.
208. See generally John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 136–37 (1971) (explaining that
principles of justice are best constructed from behind a veil of ignorance that eliminates
knowledge of individuating characteristics). In this case I refer to not knowing whether one would
contract schizophrenia or a similar disease in the future.
209. Anosognosia—Frequently Asked Questions, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., http://
treatmentadvocacycenter.org/component/content/article/1790.
210. Mounir Ouzir et al., Insight in Schizophrenia: From Conceptualization to Neuroscience,
66 PSYCHIATRY AND CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 167, 169 (Apr. 2012), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1440-1819.2012.02325.x/full#b2.
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1. Anosognosia
The word “anosognosia” combines the Greek words for disease,
“nosos,” and knowledge, “gnosis,” literally meaning “to not know a
disease.”209 It is distinguishable from denial in that the latter is “a
psychological coping mechanism . . . . [A] defense mechanism that
protects the individual from distress.”210 By contrast, anosognosia in
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schizophrenia “has an anatomical basis and is caused by damage to
the brain by the disease process.”211
A World Health Organization study found that 50 to 80 percent
of schizophrenic patients worldwide suffered from either partial or
complete lack of insight into their mental disorder.212 Fifty percent of
those with schizophrenia in the United States would translate to
approximately 1.5 million people who lack awareness regarding their
condition.213 This inability to recognize one’s own illness or aspects
thereof, also called anosognosia,214 can “occur[] in both
schizophrenia and right hemisphere lesions [of the brain] due to
stroke, dementia, and traumatic brain injury.”215 Such “lack of
insight in schizophrenia appears to be self-specific, as most patients
recognize symptoms in other patients, but fail to do so in
themselves. . . . impl[ying] that lack of insight may be caused by
disturbed abilities of self-referential processing.”216
The consequences of anosognosia for the schizophrenic patient
can be severe. “Preserved insight into illness has been suggested to
be predictive of outcome in patients with schizophrenia.”217 Studies
have associated poor insight in schizophrenia “with defects in
cognitive functions such as attention, memory, language, executive
functioning and social cognition . . . poor treatment compliance, poor
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211. The Anatomical Basis of Anosognosia-Backgrounder, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR.,
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-reports-and-studies/2143 (last updated
May 2013).
212. Ouzir et al., supra note 210, at 167 (citing WT Carpenter, Jr., et al., Flexible System for
the Diagnosis of Schizophrenia: Report From the WHO International Pilot Study of
Schizophrenia, 182 SCI. 1275, 1275–78 (1973)).
213. See Celso Arango & Xavier Amador, Lessons Learned About Poor Insight, 37
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 27 (Dec. 2010), available at http://schizophreniabulletin.oxfordjournals
.org/content/37/1/27.short#.
214. “Insight, however, may not be viewed as a simple balance between awareness and
unawareness of illness. For example, . . . some patients may recognize signs of illness but
attribute them to causes other than abnormalities in their mental states.” Ouzir et al., supra note
210, at 168 (citing X.F. Amador et al., Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA
BULL. 113, 113–32 (1991)).
215. Philip Gerretsen et al., Frontotemporoparietal Asymmetry and Lack of Illness Awareness
in Schizophrenia, 34 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 1035, 1035 (May 2013), available at http://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/hbm.21490/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&us
erIsAuthenticated=false.
216. Edith J. Liemburg et al., Reduced Connectivity in the Self-Processing Network of
Schizophrenia Patients with Poor Insight, 7 PLOS ONE e42707 (2012), http://www.plosone.org
/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0042707.
217. C. Faget-Agius et al., Schizophrenia With Preserved Insight is Associated With
Increased Perfusion of the Precuneus, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY NEUROSCIENCE 297 (Sept. 2012),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=faget-agius%20schizphrenia%20insight.
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218. Ouzir et al., supra note 208, at 167.
219. Id. However, the studies are not all consistent. For example, some studies have linked
good insight with more severe depression or greater suicide risk, while other studies have found
no such correlation; see id. at 172.
220. Id. at 168.
221. Id.
222. Why We Talk about Anosognosia, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. (Aug. 2012),
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-blog/69-no-state/2142-why-we-talk-about
-anosognosia.
223. See, e.g., SAKS, supra note 48, at 242 n.30 (“Whether we should think of denial as an
understandable psychological defense or as a symptom of an illness is unclear. . . . Some
commentators . . . make much of the idea that denial may have neurophysiological correlates. But
surely everything mental does, so I’m not sure how far this observation takes us.”); E. Fuller
Torrey, Anosognosia, Denial and the New Antipsychiatry, TREATMENT ADVOC. CENTER (Oct.
2012), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/problem/anosognosia/2178#torrey-response. .
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social and interpersonal functioning, poor prognosis, and higher risk
of relapse.”218 Additionally, “poor insight may increase the incidence
of depression, hopelessness, low self-esteem and more generally
poor quality of life.”219
Multiple studies have also found that lack of insight is
associated with disorganized symptoms, but not all studies have been
consistent in their findings in this regard.220 “Disorganization in
patients with schizophrenia represents the most direct clinical
expression of mental dissociation and may preclude the capacity to
engage in abstract thinking needed to reflect rationally on their
anomalous experiences, leaving the individual with schizophrenia
without a coherent concept of normality.”221
Furthermore, because patients who deny they are ill often refuse
medication, they can be subject to all the consequences associated
with non-adherence to treatment, including “arrest, homelessness,
hospitalization, violence and similar outcomes. . . . [P]eople who
know they are sick seek help before their condition becomes dire.
People who are unaware they are ill do not.”222
While it is undisputed that many schizophrenic patients deny
they are sick or seem to lack other awareness regarding their disease,
there is dispute among the scholarly community as to how many of
these people are in denial and how many (if any) are truly unable (at
least temporarily) to recognize their illness due to anosognosia.223
One study concluded that “the weakness of the existing relationship
between insight and severity of symptomatology on the one hand,
and between insight and emotional state on the other hand, suggests
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that both psychodynamic [denial] and clinical [anosognosia] models
are not sufficient explanatory models.”224
But there is continually mounting evidence that lack of
awareness is associated with abnormalities in the brain of
schizophrenic patients and thus may not be simply due to normal
coping mechanisms. Two decades ago there were approximately ten
empirical studies on the lack of insight into illness in schizophrenic
patients, whereas now there are hundreds.225 Some of the most recent
studies regarding the relationship of poor insight into illness in
schizophrenia and defects in the brain have included the following
findings:
x “[There is] a relationship between anosognosia and
hemispheric asymmetry in schizophrenia, supporting
previous volume-based MRI studies in schizophrenia that
found a relationship between illness unawareness and
reduced right hemisphere gray matter volume.”226

x “[S]chizophrenia patients with relatively preserved insight
showed stronger connectivity than patients with poor insight
in the anterior cingulated cortex and precuneus, both key
regions in self-reflective processing. These findings
tentatively support the hypothesis that poor insight may be
related to impaired self-related processing.”229
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224. Ouzir et al., supra note 210, at 169.
225. Arango & Amador, supra note 213, at 27.
226. Gerretsen et al., supra note 215, at 1035.
227. Tuukka T. Raij et al., Association of Poor Insight in Schizophrenia With Structure and
Function of Cortical Midline Structures and Frontopolar Cortex, 139 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 27,
27 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22664168.
228. Faget-Agius et al., supra note 217, at 297.
229. Liemburg et al., supra note 216, at 6.

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 153 Side B

x “[There is] a link between known regional brain abnormalities
[in the cortical midline structures and the frontopolar cortex]
and the manifestation of poor insight in schizophrenia.”227
x “[S]chizophrenia with preserved insight is associated with
greater [cerebral blood flow in] the precuneus, a brain area
known to be involved in self-consciousness, suggesting a
compensatory mechanism of fronto-temporal impairment.”228
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x “Impaired insight in schizophrenia implicates a complex
neural circuitry: white matter deficits in fronto-temporo brain
regions are linked to symptom unawareness; compromised
temporal and parietal white matter regions are involved in the
misattribution of symptoms. These findings suggest the
multidimensional construct of insight has multiple neural
determinants.”230
x “[P]oorer awareness of illness was associated with regional
[cortical] thinning in the left middle frontal and inferior
temporal gyri. Poorer awareness of treatment need and
efficacy was associated with cortical thinning in the left
medial frontal gyrus, precuneus and temporal gyri. . . . The
results confirm predictions derived from the anosognosia . . .
account and assert that regional thickness in frontal cortex is
associated with awareness of illness in the early phase of
psychosis . . . . [The study also] suggests that the neural
signature of insight involves a network of brain structures,
and not only the frontal lobes as previously suggested.”231
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230. Daniel Antonius et al., White Matter Integrity and Lack of Insight in Schizophrenia and
Schizoaffective Disorder, 128 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 76, 77 (May 2011), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21429714.
231. Lisa Buchy et al., Cortical Thickness Is Associated With Poor Insight in First-Episode
Psychosis, 45 J. PSYCHIATRY RES. 781, 781 (June 2011), available at http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21092987.
232. Ouzir, supra note 210, at 174.
233. Id.
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Other studies have found a relationship between poor insight in
schizophrenic patients and “reduced total brain volume, ventricular
enlargement, frontal lobe atrophy, reduced frontal lobe volume, and
gray matter deficits” in various regions of the brain.232 But not all
studies are consistent in their findings.
Other studies . . . have not found any significant
correlations between lack of insight and total brain volume,
total ventricular volume and gray or white matter volumes
in the prefrontal region. This inconsistency could arise from
the complex nature of insight and the use of a variety of
insight assessments.233
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234. Arango & Amador, supra note 213, at 27.
235. Id. (quoting DSM-IV 304 (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n Press, 2000)).
236. David Hager, “Anosognosia Is Blindness”—Personally Speaking, TREATMENT
ADVOCACY CTR. (2011), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-blog/69-nostate/2083-anosognosia-is-blindness-personally-speaking.
237. See Torrey, supra note 223.
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The American Psychiatric Association’s official classification of
mental disorders contained in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM) undertook a revision of its section on
schizophrenia in 2000 to reflect emerging scientific consensus.234
Even though less evidence was available over a decade ago, the
DSM sided with anosognosia over denial. The relevant provision
states:
A majority of individuals with schizophrenia have poor
insight regarding the fact that they have a psychotic illness.
Evidence suggests that poor insight is a manifestation of the
illness rather than a coping strategy. It may be comparable
to the lack of awareness of neurological deficits seen in
stroke, termed anosognosia. This symptom predisposes the
individual to noncompliance with treatment and has been
found to be predictive of higher relapse rates, increased
number of involuntary hospital admissions, poorer
psychosocial functioning, and poorer course of illness.235
The implications of anosognosia to the involuntary treatment
debate are manifold. “For example, can a person truly give informed
consent for treatment of an illness that he cannot see? How is legal
competency affected? What should state laws, policies and resources
look like in addressing this?”236
If we believe a mentally ill person has the capacity to make an
informed, rational decision regarding refusing medication, there is a
greater natural tendency to respect the choice (even if it is a decision
we don’t believe is in the patient’s best interest) as a valid exercise of
agency and civil rights. But if we believe there is brain damage from
the schizophrenia that impairs the patient’s ability to make an
informed, rational choice, it drastically changes the equation. We are
no longer respecting a person’s informed choice, rather we are
protecting an inadequately informed delusion.237 And if patients
cannot recognize their illness, and medication is in their best
interests, it is not clear that their autonomy interests should weigh
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supreme—for perhaps if they could recognize the illness, they would
accept treatment.
Professor Elyn Saks argues that even if the reasons for denial are
illness-based (which she does not concede), this “is no reason for not
respecting the choices based on them. . . . . Respecting autonomy is
extremely important, and we demonstrate our commitment to it when
we respect the autonomy of those whose decision-making is
somewhat (though not grossly) compromised.”238
In response, I argue that not knowing one is ill is a “gross
impairment” when the decision is whether to take medication. If you
do not believe you are ill, it would never make sense to take these
powerful brain-altering medications. Indeed, at least one study has
shown that the most common reason for individuals with severe
psychiatric disorders to not take their medication was that they did
not believe they were ill.239 Other studies have usually found a strong
association between the two.240
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238. SAKS, supra note 48, at 108.
239. Why Individuals With Severe Psychiatric Disorders Often Do Not Take Their
Medications-Backgrounder,
TREATMENT
ADVOCACY
CTR.
(Apr. 2011),
http://
treatmentadvocacycenter.org/resources/consequences-of-lack-of-treatment/anosognosia/1375why-individuals-with-severe-psychiatric-disorders-often-do-not-take-their-medications
(citing
Ronald C. Kessler et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of Untreated Serious Mental Illness, 36
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 987, 996 (2001)).
240. See id. But while “[t]he majority of studies support the assumption that insight is
associated with adherence during treatment phase . . . the association with long-term adherence
remains unclear. Insight correlates with better long-term functioning, but this might be explained
by its association with symptoms.” Tania M. Lincoln et al., Correlates and Long-Term
Consequences of Poor Insight in Patients With Schizophrenia. A Systematic Review, 33
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 1324, 1324 (2007), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed
/17289653?dopt=Abstract.
241. EAGLEMAN, supra note 127, at 157.
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2. Potential Effects of Changes in Brain Chemistry
or Structure on Personality and Choices
There are now many documented examples of how a
person’s personality and choices may be changed when a
person’s brain is altered by injury or illness. David Eagleman, a
renowned neuroscientist, has explained that even slight changes
in one’s brain chemistry can cause large changes in behavior.241
Such changes highlight the complexity of the autonomy issue
when trying to distinguish the “real” self from the self whose
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242. The Neuroscience of Decision Making, THE KAVLI FOUND. (Aug. 2011), http://www
.kavlifoundation.org/science-spotlights/neuroscience-of-decision-making.
243. Quoted in The Neuroscience of Decision Making, supra note 242 (emphasis added).
244. Marion Larquet et al., Impaired Decision Making in Schizophrenia and Orbitofrontal
Cortex Lesion Patients, 116 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 266, 272 (2010), available at http://
dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/472/docs/Larquet_Coricelli_Schizophrenia_Research_2010.pdf.
245. Id. at 271.
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choices may be affected by mental illness.
In the case of a severe mental illness like schizophrenia, the
symptoms can clearly change the perceptions and thought processes
of the individual—even when not rendering a person irrational. A
relatively new field known as “decision neuroscience” studies what
happens in human brains during decision making and endeavors to
map thinking on a cellular level.242 One expert in the field, C. Daniel
Salzman at Columbia University School of Medicine, explained that
for many psychiatric disorders, patients that are
symptomatic are frequently making poor decisions about
numerous things throughout the day . . . . If you’ve ever had
a friend or family member with depression, you can see
they are not making decisions the way they normally do. So
there clearly has to be dysfunction in the neurocircuits of
psychiatric patients affecting their decisions.243
One study of the decision-making process of schizophrenic
patients found that those “with prominent positive symptoms were
unable to feel regret, and to learn from what they could have
obtained with a different choice. This impairment contributes
strongly to the inability of these patients to generate adaptive
behavior in individual and social environments.”244 However, other
schizophrenic patients without the prominent positive symptoms
reacted similarly to the healthy controls in the study except that they
exhibited more risk-seeking behavior.245
Of course none of this necessarily indicates that the healthy self
would prefer medication when the unhealthy self refuses. But these
examples do suggest that there can be significant differences in the
expressed desires and choices of the two selves due to the illness.
These examples also suggest that, though not always rising to the
level of incompetence, these individuals’ decision-making process
may be impaired by disease. This Article does not take the position
that society should thus disregard the decisions and desires of the
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severely mentally ill. But it does argue that under some
circumstances this may be justification for weighing autonomy
interests (insofar as they relate to the desires expressed by the ill
individual) less strongly than for those with illnesses that do not
target the brain in the same degree.
IV. PROPOSED REFORM
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246. Brian A. Palmer et al., The Lifetime Risk of Suicide in Schizophrenia: A Reexamination,
62 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 247, 250 (2005), available at http://archpsyc.jamanetwork
.com/article.aspx?articleid=208392.
247. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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A. Finding the Proper Balance
How should all these scientific insights influence finding the
proper balance between autonomy and patient welfare? In terms of
patient welfare, weighing on the side of forcible intervention is not
just the patient’s suffering, but also the vital importance of early
treatment, without which irreversible damage may occur and
long-term prognosis worsens. Early treatment may also prevent
suicide (certainly clozapine has been shown to be very effective in
doing so)—and suicide is a substantial risk for schizophrenia
patients, especially in early years.246
Although patient welfare initially seems to weigh against forced
treatment when one considers the serious potential side effects of the
current antipsychotic drugs, the emerging science suggests that, even
if better drugs are not on the immediate horizon, more and more
individualized analysis will be possible to determine which patients
will have which reactions to which drugs. Thus, there will be greater
capacity to tailor treatment in ways that minimize serious side
effects. And a patient-welfare analysis cannot be complete without
evaluating the severity of the case, and thus whether the side effects
are a better or worse condition than the untreated disease for the
patient. In cases of severe psychosis, there is broad-based consensus
that the best outcomes generally come from consistent medication
coupled with counseling.247
Then there are issues of autonomy. When should a patient be
able to decide for himself whether the untreated disease is better or
worse than taking medications? Or simply that he or she wants to
refuse them on different bases? Some have objected to involuntary
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248. See, e.g., SAKS, supra note 48, at 86.
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treatment on the grounds that outside the context of mental illness
society generally allows people to refuse medication if they wish,
even for what most might consider irrational reasons.248 Is there
something fundamentally different about mental illness that should
overcome an equal protection argument of that kind?
There are fundamental differences because of the way changes
in brain chemistry and structure can change personality and decisionmaking, and even change one’s ability to recognize one’s own
disease. The fundamental difference is that with the severely
mentally ill, their illness targets and may drastically affect the
necessary organ for decision-making. A person may still appear
competent in a technical sense (with the ability to reason at least at
some level), while making dramatically different decisions than the
person would have made before illness or injury or chemical changes
affected the brain.
But even if one is willing to accept the healthy self as the true
self whose wishes ought to be respected (not a position all accept,
but one this Article assumes is correct), how can one determine what
the healthy self would have wanted? For perhaps both sick and
healthy self would agree that the medications are undesirable
regardless of the physical consequences of refusing treatment.
Severely mentally ill people may have rational reasons for refusing
medication.
Elyn Saks has explained that mentally ill patients’ rational
reasons for refusing medication (not necessarily wise ones—but
reasons that are not based on delusions or hallucinations) generally
fall within one of five categories: (1) concerns regarding side effects
(not only the possible physical and mental side effects previously
discussed, but also the attendant stigma of visible side effects for
conditions such as movement disorders); (2) some patients may
prefer the mentally ill state due to factors such as the bleakness of
reality and relief of pain that may come with active psychosis, the
care and attention it fosters from others, identifying the illness with
one’s true self, or a desire to punish oneself; (3) a “desire to avoid
narcissistic injury,” which is “[r]ationalized as a belief that one
shouldn’t rely on crutches” or “as a desire to improve on one’s own;”
(4) denial; and (5) reactivity—meaning the patient may use refusal of
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Id. at 96.
Id.
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 233–34 (2006). Slobogin explains that “the ultimate
inquiry should focus on the extent to which the person believes ‘facts’ for which there is no
evidence . . . .” Id. at 244.
253. SAKS, supra note 48, at 236 n.8.
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the medication as bargaining power, a vent for negative emotions, or
to control caregivers in some way.249
She argues that with the exception of side effect concerns that
may be moderated by actual experience with the drugs, the rest of
these concerns may not necessarily change after a round of forced
medication.250 Indeed, forcible medication may exacerbate some of
these objections. While she agrees that the severely mentally ill are
generally better off when they take their medications willingly, she
thinks it too great an affront to autonomy to disregard such rational
refusals under most circumstances. Instead she supports therapeutic
efforts to try to help patients accept treatment willingly.251
Professor Christopher Slobogin likewise would define
competence broadly in order to respect most patients’ treatment
decisions despite the potential existence of significant pathology. He
advocates the “basic rationality and self-regard standard,” according
to which a “person should have to understand the relevant facts, be
free of any fixed, false beliefs about those facts, and be willing to
exercise decision-making authority.”252
The positions of Saks and Slobogin gain significant support
from evidence that consensual treatment is generally more effective
than forced treatment for mentally ill patients.253 The evidence that
medication accompanied by therapy is far more successful than
either of those approaches alone also supports the theory, because
therapy requires a greater degree of mental compliance than does an
injection of antipsychotics. Furthermore, Slobogin explains that the
pragmatists among us should note that “psychiatric treatments are
not always effective and carry significant risks; . . . experiencing
decompensation may trigger the necessary motivation to try
treatment; . . . lifelong medication is . . . a very expensive
proposition; . . . some untreatable people who are presently in
hospitals should not be there,” and that “a robust right to refuse
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encourages dialogue between doctor and patient that is all too rare
when the patient is mentally disabled.”254
Given these ambiguities and tensions between autonomy and
patient welfare, the proper standard for involuntary treatment cannot
entirely favor one interest over the other. Society already recognizes
a justification for involuntary treatment in some situations of danger
and incompetence. But those terms are generally so severely defined
that they do not justify involuntary treatment for people who are
actively and severely psychotic and clearly not reasoning in a normal
fashion. Mike Earley is an illustrative example—someone who was
so sick that he broke into a house to have a bubble bath and wrapped
tinfoil around his head to keep people in the TV from reading his
thoughts—and yet his father could not get him committed or
involuntarily treated until his father lied about Mike having
threatened his father’s life.255 One doctor judged Mike’s competence
by such facts as Mike’s ability to name the president of the United
States and count backwards by sevens, despite recognizing his “odd”
behavior.256 This example also demonstrates the issue of external
costs to society when psychotic patients refuse treatment. Such costs
are not limited to physical violence and may be of a fundamentally
different nature than the costs associated with those who refuse
treatment for other types of physical illness.
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B. A New Standard: Widening the Safety Net to Match Current Data
The new standard I propose to add to existing involuntary
treatment laws is that (1) if a person is suffering from a severe
psychotic episode, (2) earnest efforts have been made to convince the
patient to voluntarily take medication—including discussion
regarding why the patient objects and possible alternatives that could
meet those concerns, (3) and medication is in their best medical
interest, then (4) involuntary treatment should be allowed at least
during the first two years of treated illness (measured from the first
date of treatment following a severe psychotic break) or age twentyseven, whichever is later. I would also require that therapy be offered
as a companion to antipsychotic drugs due to the evidence that both
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254. SLOBOGIN, supra note 252, at 245.
255. See EARLEY, supra note 13, at 20–21
256. Id. at 14–15, 21–25.
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257. See Insel, supra note 141, at 188.
258. Schizophrenia, N.Y. TIMES HEALTH GUIDE, http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides
/disease/schizophrenia/risk-factors.html (last visited February 5, 2014)
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are necessary for optimal outcomes, and I would allow the
involuntary medication to continue so long as deemed necessary
under the current best medical evidence to provide mental stability. I
would also require that the medication be offered under an outpatient
program if that is deemed possible—thus the patient could remain in
the community so long as he or she continued to comply with the
medication and counseling order. If a person were forcibly medicated
under this provision, I would also allow an exception to the privacy
laws regarding medical records for adult immediate family members
or other primary caregivers—so long as they could demonstrate that
they have the best interests of the patient in mind and will participate
in an approved education program tailored to supporting someone
with the patient’s condition. A patient could contest that exception
and be represented by counsel in doing so.
Why two years and why age twenty-seven? The rationale for
twenty-seven years is that psychotic breaks for a disease like
schizophrenia peak from eighteen to twenty-five—when the brain is
still maturing.257 This period seems to be a crucial one in brain
development and manifestation of the disease. Putting the age at
twenty-seven would ensure both that patients can be medicated
during the crucial period of brain maturation and that all who have
their first psychotic break within the peak period will have at least
two years of leeway for getting needed treatment when their
symptoms become severe. Because treatment in the initial years of
illness is so critical to long term prognosis and prevention of
irreversible injury—I would allow the two years from whenever a
patient first begins being treated for severe psychosis—even if it is
after age twenty-seven.
But drawing lines in shifting sand is always difficult. Both the
two-year and age-twenty-seven limits may need to be revised as
research progresses. For example, given that men tend to develop
schizophrenia earlier than women (age 15–24 for men as compared
to age 25–34 for women),258 perhaps science will reveal a basis for
creating different involuntary treatment standards for the two
genders. In the future, science may also be better able to distinguish
between the effects of psychosis on the brain as caused by different
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259. See Diagnosis and Interventions, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
http://www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/First_Episode/Diagnosis_and_Interventions.htm
(last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
260. See SAKS, supra note 48, at 89–90; Adam G. Gerhardstein, Comment, A First Episode
Standard for Involuntary Treatment, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 469. (Gerhardstein’s definition of the
standard is different in some minor respects); Winick et al., supra note 113, at 99.
261. SAKS, supra note 48, at 89–90. Elyn Saks also proposes that, once stabilized by the
medications, patients should be free to “self-bind”—commit to whether they want medication
forcibly applied in the future if they are in a psychotic state. Id. at 91.
262. Gerhardstein, supra note 260, at 2.

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 158 Side B

diseases (or different stages of disease) on the psychotic spectrum,259
which might also require creation of multiple involuntary treatment
standards or other refinements.
It is important to note that the time limits in the proposed
standard are not meant to override other laws that allow for
involuntary treatment under different circumstances in various
states—for example laws based on dangerousness or an assessment
of likely deterioration based on past experience. This standard would
simply serve as an additional tool for early intervention.
Why choose these time limits rather than simply adhering to a
previously proposed reform that would allow “one free shot” of
involuntary treatment for first-time, serious psychoses if medication
is likely to be of benefit?260 Professor Elyn Saks stresses that this
“one shot” standard would allow a patient to experience the benefits
of medication and thus have a fuller understanding of the choice to
accept or refuse medication in the future.261 Another author supports
a similar standard because:
(1) it would soften the trauma of a first episode, assisting
families in their attempts to intervene before their loved
ones’ lives are in complete disarray and their episodes
escalate to the point of violence; (2) it would expand access
to early, effective treatment, which gives individuals
experiencing their first major episodes the best chance for a
healthy long-term prognosis; and (3) it would cut down
health care costs paid by government programs.262
While the “one shot” standard is preferable to the present status
of the law, it still overemphasizes immediate autonomy at the
expense of both long-term autonomy and patient welfare. It would
still allow a clearly psychotic individual whose reasoning capacity is
unquestionably affected by illness to refuse medication despite it
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263. See Palmer et al., supra note 246.
264. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 252, at 245 (citing Richard Rogers and Christopher
Webster, Assessing Treatability in Mentally Disordered Offenders, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19,
2021 (1989)).
265. Nancy A. Melville, Noncompliance With Schizophrenia Therapy Usually Persists,
MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (Nov. 10, 2012), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/774271.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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being in his or her best medical interest—so long as the “one free
shot” had been spent. It makes no prolonged exception for the early
years of the illness when studies show treatment is vital to long-term
outcome and the suicide risk is highest. Indeed, suicide is over three
times more likely at the earliest stages of schizophrenia.263
Autonomy does not lose all weight under the circumstances of
severe and active psychoses. Patients experiencing such episodes
have not lost their humanity or their consequent need to be valued,
heard, and respected. Indeed, the new standard reflects this respect
for human dignity and autonomy in requiring that forced medication
never be administered absent earnest efforts to first convince a
patient to voluntarily comply—including exploring why the patient is
resistant and whether there are alternatives that could address those
concerns. This provision of the standard is also meant to address the
research showing that people who voluntarily comply with treatment
tend to respond better than those forcibly treated.264
But the hope that efforts to reason with severely psychotic
patients would be adequately successful in convincing the severely
mentally ill to continue taking medications that are necessary for
their health and ability to function in society is clearly a fallacy. A
recent study has shown that “[w]hen patients with schizophrenia
discontinue oral antipsychotic therapy soon after initiation, as is
common, chances are not good that they will become adherent to the
therapy later in their illness.”265 Dr. Bruce J. Wong from the
University of Pennsylvania, who presented the study at the 2012 U.S.
Psychiatric and Mental Health Congress, explained that “[e]arly
noncompliance begets later noncompliance— . . . so if you’re going
to manage compliance, manage it early . . . . There are many
suggestions for fostering compliance in the literature, but none are
very successful.”266 Results from the CATIE study show that up to
74 percent of schizophrenic patients discontinue medication soon
after initiation.267
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268. Jeffrey A. Lieberman, The Case for Early Psychosis Intervention, 2007 Annual Sessions
of the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, May 22, 2007. See summary: Randall, F. White, Medscape
Perspectives on the 2007 Annual Sessions of the American Psychiatric Association: May 22,
2007, MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (May 23, 2007), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/557112.
269. Tomas, supra note 10, at 588; see also M. Giron et al., Efficacy and Effectiveness of
Individual Family Intervention on Social and Clinical Functioning and Family Burden in Severe
Schizophrenia: A 2-Year Randomized Controlled Study, 40 PSYCHOL. MED. 73 (2010), available
at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=6778348 (“Family
intervention was associated with fewer clinical relapses, hospitalizations and major incidents, and
an improvement in positive and negative symptoms, social role performance, social relations,
employment and family burden. . . . Family intervention is effective in severe schizophrenia
independently of compliance and prognostic factors.”); Thomas C. Jewell et al., Partnering With
Families: Multiple Family Group Psychoeducation for Schizophrenia, 65 J. OF CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 868 (Aug. 2009), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002
/jclp.20610/abstract (discussing family intervention as an effective means of reducing relapses
and rehospitalization, especially when families are trained about the mental disorder and ways to
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Given these statistics, having the medications administered once
forcibly is not likely to adequately address the problem of
noncompliance and its effects. In making policies regarding
treatment, society cannot ignore the scientific evidence that
“recurrent psychotic episodes correlate with brain tissue loss in the
frontal, parietal, and temporal lobes, and with worsening treatment
response.”268 Couple this with the fact that a person’s judgment is
inevitably impaired by severe and active psychosis, and that a
symptom of the disease may be to not have insight that one is sick at
all, it would seem that patient welfare should outweigh immediate
autonomy interests during severe psychosis, at least under some
circumstances.
The privacy waiver also protects patient welfare interests. The
support a patient receives from family and loved ones can be critical
to recovery. Indeed, research has shown that when families receive
specialized education and training directed at helping them
understand the patient’s illness and how to offer support, outcomes
improve for patients on multiple levels.
Published clinical trials have provided consistent evidence
on family interventions reducing psychotic relapses, having
a positive effect on family relationships and reducing
overall costs of care . . . . Recent meta-analyses have
confirmed that . . . family interventions reduce patients’
relapse rate and hospital admissions, improve patients’
compliance to antipsychotic drug treatments, and improve
social impairment . . . .269

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 160 Side A

09/23/2014 13:40:53

RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC?

Fall 2013]

A RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC?

9/1/2014 6:48 PM

307

C M
Y K

09/23/2014 13:40:53

be supportive throughout the recovery process); Insel, supra note 141 (“[A]n aggressive focus on
cognition along with family support may prove surprisingly effective for preempting or
forestalling psychosis.”).
270. This brings up the issue of self-binding while mentally stable, which Elyn Saks supports.
See SAKS, supra note 47, at 91. I do not include such a provision in this standard partly because it
would not allow actively psychotic individuals who had self-bound to no medication to change
their minds. To not allow a patient to choose what is in the patient’s best medical interest at any
point seems unconscionable. I understand the logic of respecting the mentally stable choices—
especially when the psychotic condition is congruent with incompetency. But given the
complexity of the brain and all that science both does and does not understand about what may be
affecting a severely mentally ill person’s choices, it seems there are insufficient scientific or
moral grounds for ever barring medication from a person who clearly needs it and expresses a
desire for it. Self-binding in favor of medication (so long as that remains in the patient’s best
medical interest) would be acceptable as it does not raise the same concerns. This topic may be
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But privacy laws often act as a barrier to family members or
other primary caregivers from understanding what is occurring or
how best to help. To account for rare cases where there are malicious
intentions in seeking private medical information, I would allow the
patient to contest such waivers.
Factors that would protect against unnecessary encroachment on
autonomy in this standard include (1) time limits, (2) the fact that the
psychotic episode would have to be severe, and (3) that the
intervention would have to be in the patient’s best medical interest.
This latter point would require individualized analysis about the
potential effects of specific medications upon the patient at hand,
given both the patient’s medical history and the current research
regarding biomarkers and likely reactions to specific drugs. The
patient would have to be given a drug that achieves an appropriate
balance between likely effectiveness and potential side effects. If an
acceptable balance could not be achieved—if, for example, all
available drugs had been tried in the past without effect—then the
patient’s refusal should be honored.
There are multiple problems this standard addresses that are not
met by the “one free shot” method. First, patients often hope and/or
believe (rightly or wrongly) that they will not revert to psychosis if
they go off their medications. Thus, the fact that patients stop their
medication does not necessarily mean that they have decided while
in their “right mind” that they do not want medication if the
psychosis resurfaces. They may have wanted that help if psychosis
recurred—but the psychosis itself may alter the decision they make
in the moment of crisis.270 Second, the process of finding an effective
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drug for a specific patient is currently often a trial-and-error process.
Therefore, the fact that a patient is unsatisfied with the effect of one
drug does not mean the patient could not find a satisfactory balance
between effectiveness and side effects with a different antipsychotic.
Third, a patient may be refusing drugs on the irrational and false
basis of not believing he or she is sick due to anosognosia. Fourth, if
psychotic episodes are permanently damaging the brain in ever
increasing proportions, allowing patients to refuse help will be
severely limiting the range of freedom to make autonomous choices
in the future.
V. OVERCOMING POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
As explained previously, a constitutional right to refuse has been
argued on multiple grounds.271 This section will not attempt to
address every possible constitutional attack of this proposed
standard, but will address some of the principal arguments that could
be made. An underlying assumption derived from the scientific
evidence previously discussed in this Article is that a psychotic
break, in and of itself, does constitute a significant “danger to self”
and thus provides at least one of the valid interests in intervention.272
The patient’s “grave disability” or “need for treatment” are arguably
other such interests.273
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worthy of its own article as advanced directives have increased in popularity across a variety of
circumstances.
271. See MELTON et al., supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Mossman, supra note
136, at 1129–38 (explaining how courts have held that the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, along with the Right of Privacy, ensure a right to refuse).
272. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225–26 (1990) (upholding a policy that
allowed forced medication in a prison environment if the prisoner was a danger to self or others);
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (identifying dangerousness as one of the key
factors in determining whether involuntary commitment is justified).
273. See, e.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 225–26; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 618 (1979)
(suggesting that “need for treatment” may be a sufficient interest to overcome liberty interests in
the context of minor children institutionalized by their parents or guardians).
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A. Liberty Interest
As discussed earlier in this Article, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Constitution as protecting a liberty interest in refusing
antipsychotic drugs—but that liberty is not absolute. Other interests
can override it, and the strength of the liberty interest was influenced
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274. See Harper, 494 U.S. 210.
275. Michael Muskal, Jared Loughner Sentenced to Life in Tucson Mass Shooting, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/08/nation/la-na-nn-jared-loughner-lifein-prison-20121108.
276. United States v. Loughner, No. 11-10339, 2011 WL 2694294, at *1–2 (9th Cir. July 12,
2011) (order “enjoining the Bureau of Prisons from forcibly medicating Loughner with
psychotropic drugs”).
277. Id. at *1.
278. United States. v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 745 n.10 (9th Cir. 2012).
279. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992)
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by the severity of the possible side effects in Harper—a case that
was heard before second-generation drugs were widely used.274
An interesting example of a court weighing the side effects in
terms of a liberty interest occurred in the case involving Jared
Loughner, the man who shot former Representative Giffords, killed
six, and wounded twelve others in Tucson in 2011.275 In an order that
same year from the Ninth Circuit, reviewing the district court’s
decision to continue Loughner’s involuntarily treatment, the court
initially ignored second-generation advances in psychotic drugs.276 It
cited Harper as authority for the fact that side effects can be fatal,
and such side effects were one of the factors that the court relied on
in barring involuntary treatment, at least temporarily.277 But a later
opinion in the same case allowed involuntary treatment and noted
that:
[S]ome of the Court’s concerns in Harper have been
lessened to some extent by significant pharmacological
advances. . . . [T]he frequency of tardive dyskinesia is a
fifth or one-tenth of what it was before; neuroleptic
malignant syndrome is vanishingly rare; extrapyramidal
effects (Parkinson-like disorders) that had an incidence rate
of 75 [percent] with Haldol occur very rarely, at the same
level as with a placebo; and akathisia is also markedly less
frequent.278
While the less serious side effects of second-generation
antipsychotics and the apparently upcoming advances in
personalizing treatment do not eliminate the liberty interest in
refusing medication, they do somewhat reduce its gravity. And cases
from the Supreme Court have continually made room for the fact that
an “overriding justification”279 may overcome a person’s liberty
interest to refuse medication (even when first-generation drugs are
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involved). “Grave disability,” “need for treatment,” and “danger to
self,” whose definitions could all certainly be broadened to include a
severe psychotic episode, are arguably among those potentially
overriding interests.
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280. Id. at 145 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 (1987)).
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Brandon,
158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Weston, 36 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999); State v.
Adams, 888 P.2d 1207 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
283. See Mossman, supra note 135, at 1053.
284. Demjaha et al., supra note 166, at 1203.
285. Schizophrenia, Treatment and Drugs, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org
/diseases-conditions/schizophrenia/basics/treatment/con-20021077 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
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B. First Amendment
In his concurrence in Riggins, Justice Kennedy explained that
the right for an accused to testify in his or her own words is “related
to the Fifth Amendment choice to speak [with the] ‘unfettered
exercise of his own will.’”280 He expressed concern that “medication
of the type here prescribed may be for the very purpose of imposing
constraints on the defendant’s own will, and for that reason its
legitimacy is put in grave doubt.”281
The interests involved in a criminal proceeding and how they
should factor into the involuntary treatment debate are beyond the
scope of this Article—which looks at involuntary treatment in a more
general sense. But while Justice Kennedy and the other Justices did
not address the First Amendment directly in that case, the concern
expressed above clearly related to how much the drugs were
interfering with the free thought processes of the mind that contribute
to free speech as well. The First Amendment has been used as the
basis for objection to forced medication in other cases.282
To engage with the question of whether antipsychotics unduly
interfere with rights of free speech, free thought, or free will (three
rather weighty autonomy interests), one must have some
understanding of what antipsychotic medications are doing to the
brain. Unfortunately, however, the science is not entirely clear.
The brain contains certain chemicals called neurotransmitters
that transmit signals between nerve cells.283 “All currently approved
antipsychotic medications block dopamine receptors.”284 Some also
affect the neurotransmitter serotonin.285 Because of “the tight
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286. Philip Seeman & Shitij Kapur, Schizophrenia: More Dopamine, More D2 Receptors, 97
PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 7673, 7673–75 (July 5, 2000), available at http://
bjp.rcpsych.org/content/181/4/271.fullhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC33999/.
287. See H. M. Jones and L.S. Pilowsky, Dopamine and Antipsychotic Drug Action Revisited,
181 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 271, 271–75 (2002).
288. Rebecca Kuepper et al., The Dopamine Dysfunction in Psychosis Revisited: New Insights
Into Topography and Course, in 212 CURRENT ANTIPSYCHOTICS, HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL PHARMACOLOGY 79 (Gerhard Gross & Mark A. Geyer eds., 2012).
289. Id.
290. “Although many attempts have been made to explain clozapine’s superior antipsychotic
effect, the [mechanism of action] is still poorly understood.” Magdalena Nord & Lars Farde,
Antipsychotic Occupancy of Dopamine Receptors in Schizophrenia, 17 CNS NEUROSCIENCE &
THERAPEUTICS 97 (Apr. 2011), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111
/j.1755-5949.2010.00222.x/full.
291. NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 25, at 10.
292. Id.
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correlation between the clinical potency and the [specific dopamine
receptor]-blocking action” scientists had theorized that “dopamine
overactivity could be the common denominator in the psychotic
element of schizophrenia.”286
Known as the “dopamine hypothesis,” it became clear with
further research that the hypothesis had weaknesses, for some
patients failed to respond to treatment despite highly successful
blockades of a specific dopamine receptor, and other patients
responded well to treatment with a much lower blockade rate.287 The
dopamine hypothesis has necessarily been “[r]efined and modified
in . . . intervening years” but to this “date remains central to the
pathophysiology of schizophrenia.”288 Recent studies suggest that
“dopaminergic excess may . . . be an early pathogenic condition
leading to irreversible cortical dysfunction.”289
Thus, although scientists have evidence-supported hypotheses as
to how these drugs work, and have discovered some of their
functions in the brain, it is not yet certain why some people respond
well and others do not, nor why a drug like clozapine has superior
antipsychotic effect to the other antipsychotic drugs.290
When they are successful, these drugs do eliminate or reduce
positive symptoms of schizophrenia such as hallucinations, agitation,
and delusions.291 Hallucinations and agitation generally recede
within days, while delusions generally take several weeks to
subside—but there is no absolute rule due to the variety of people’s
responses to antipsychotic medications.292
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State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747 (La. 1992).
Mossman, supra note 136, at 1130–31 (quotations and citations omitted).
SAKS, supra note 48, at 110.
Id. at 116.
See Editorial, supra note 8.
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293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
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Therefore, it is true that antipsychotic drugs change the thought
processes of psychotic patients, but they do not, in the words of one
court, seize “control of . . . mind and thoughts.”293 The typical
medical view of the issue was explained well by Professor Douglas
Mossman:
[P]ersons who are psychotic have severely impaired
thinking abilities, and antipsychotic medications can, by
reducing this impairment, improve thinking and thereby
confer greater freedom of expression on their recipients. . . .
Psychosis is itself involuntary mind control of the most
extensive kind and itself represents the most severe
intrusion on the integrity of the human being. . . .
psychotropic medications do not alter a patient’s thoughts
about specific political or social issues. Properly
administered, they improve a psychotic patient’s ability to
think about whatever he wishes. . . . Neuroleptics are to
psychosis what eye glasses are to myopia: both
interventions remove impediments to perception; neither
proscribes particular thoughts or actions, though both may
enhance decision making and the ability to respond.294
Although the metaphor of eyeglasses makes an interesting point,
it is also illustrative of some chinks in the medical viewpoint. First,
eyeglasses carry no risk of dangerous side effects. Second, they are
not so intrusive or irreversible as a foreign substance entering the
body. And third, while it is true that there is no mind control in terms
of specifically implanted thoughts on any particular topic, the drugs
do alter the mind by “suppress[ing] psychotic thoughts.”295
However, on the latter point (the one most relevant to the First
Amendment argument), I agree with Professor Elyn Saks that the
drugs are not “invidiously mind-controlling in any sense of the
word[, but] [a]s the drugs improve [or change] . . . we will have to
grapple with these issues further.”296 Due to the lack of present or
recent progress on the drug front for psychotic diseases like
schizophrenia, this analysis remains unchanged.297 The drugs alter
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298. SAKS, supra note 48, at 116.
299. For example, Egas Moniz won the Nobel Prize in 1949 for inventing prefrontal
lobotomies, which are now “remembered as one of the most spectacular failures in the history of
medicine.” Jenell Johnson, A Dark History: Memories of Lobotomy in the New Era of
Psychosurgery, 1 MED. STUDIES 367, 367 (2009), available at http://link.springer.com
/article/10.1007%2Fs12376-009-0031-7?LI=true#page-2. “Lobotomies for mental illness fell out
of favor in the 1960s because of the development of effective antipsychotic medications, misuse
of the procedure, and a growing unease among doctors with the confusion and stupor that resulted
from the operation.” Barron H. Lerner, When Lobotomy Was Seen as Advanced, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/health/report-on-eva-peron-recalls-timewhen-lobotomy-was-embraced.html?_r=0.
300. EAGLEMAN, supra note 127, at 181–82.
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the mind, but the changes are toward allowing the patient to once
again form his or her own more reality-based thoughts. The drugs are
thus arguably not destroying autonomy but enhancing it—especially
when one considers the implications on freedom to make other
choices. A psychotic individual is not nearly as free as a stableminded one to choose to pursue an education, a job, and meaningful
relationships due to the intellectual limitations imposed by the
illness.
But if later drugs were shown to encroach too much on the
integrity of the personhood of a patient, the “stakes [might]
change.”298 Science has in the not-too-distant past been quick to
embrace methods that later were deemed far too great an
encroachment in just that sense.299 “The ethical problem pivots on
how much a state should be able to change its citizens.”300
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court arguably has shown
some signs of agreement with the position that the First Amendment
is not violated by involuntary administration of antipsychotics. One
court explained:
We note that the petitioner in Sell claimed that he had a
“fundamental, first amendment right to avoid forced
medication aimed at changing the way he thinks.” The
standard articulated in Sell did not, however, require that
the trial court consider a defendant’s First Amendment
rights in determining whether involuntary medication is
proper. The United States Supreme Court, thus, implicitly
rejected the petitioner’s claim that an incompetent
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defendant has a First Amendment right to avoid involuntary
medication.301
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301. State v. Jacobs, 828 A.2d 587, 589 n.3 (Conn. 2003). Sell also recognized that refusals
may be overridden if the government interest is sufficiently strong. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S.
166, 178–79 (2003).
302. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179; Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
303. Meltzer, supra note 195.
304. Id.; Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness (CATIE), NAT’L INST.
MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/trials/practical/catie/index.shtml; see, e.g., Brakel &
Davis, supra note 83, at 522 (discussing the uselessness of the CATIE study from a legal policy
standpoint because of the numerous limitations placed upon the study); Samuel Jan Brakel,
Searching for the Therapy in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 455, 499 n.59 (2007) (expressing the various follies of the CATIE trial including
the type of drugs compared, biased influences of drug company funding, and other various
shortcomings of the methodology of the trial).
305. Mossman & Steinberg, supra note 185, at 294 (citing Jeffrey A. Lieberman, What the
CATIE Study Means for Clinical Practice, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1075 (2006)).
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C. Less Intrusive Means
One of the relevant factors in both Riggins and Sell was whether
“less intrusive means” than forcible administration of antipsychotic
drugs were available.302 Have scientific developments produced less
intrusive means of treating an illness like schizophrenia? The short
answer is “no.” Antipsychotic drugs are still the most effective
known means of controlling the positive symptoms of a disease like
schizophrenia.
As discussed previously, there has been progress toward
developing a more personalized approach to treatment. Dr. Meltzer
explains that just as the current cutting edge breakthroughs in cancer
research stem from genetic identification of what mutation has
caused the cancer and then developing specific therapies, Dr. Meltzer
states that science is “just at the threshold” of such developments in
treating severe mental illnesses within the Psychotic Spectrum.303
He and other scholars have been highly critical of the NIMH’s
Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness Study
(CATIE) that has periodically released findings beginning in 2005
regarding the treatment of schizophrenia: Dr. Meltzer called the
study “miserably designed” for the purposes asserted.304 But he
would presumably agree with the study’s lead author that “the
medications had significant differences and that the treatment should
be individualized.”305 An individualized approach would presumably
be less intrusive in that it could be more effective and provide less
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severe side effects for the patient, but it would still involve the forced
administration of antipsychotic drugs.
For non-positive symptoms of schizophrenia, however, there are
new discoveries of possibly effective treatments that would be less
intrusive than the forced administration of drugs. For example, in
February 2012, a study was published showing improvement in
reality-monitoring among schizophrenic patients who attended eighty
hours of computerized cognitive training.306 “Reality-monitoring is
the ability to separate the inner world from outer reality. . . . It is a
complex cognitive function that is impaired in schizophrenia.”307
Brain scans also showed that this improvement correlated with
increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex—a region of the
brain that supports self-referential cognition. And recovery of
activity in that brain region was associated with improved social
functioning six months later.308 The study suggests that “the neural
impairments in schizophrenia are not immutably fixed but may be
amenable to well-designed interventions that target restoration of
neural system functioning.”309 These findings “set[] the groundwork
for what could be a new treatment approach in psychiatric illness—a
new tool we could use in addition to medication, psychotherapeutic
approaches or cognitive behavioral approaches.”310
Indeed, the NIMH is currently funding a trial at eleven U.S.
research centers to evaluate the effectiveness of computer-based
treatment of cognitive impairment in schizophrenia for potential
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307. Karuna Subramaniam, the study’s first author, quoted in Rick Nauert, Computer Therapy
for Schizophrenia, PSYCHCENTRAL (Mar. 1, 2012), http://psychcentral.com/news/2012/03
/01/computer-therapy-for-schizophrenia/35457.html.
308. Subramaniam et al., supra note 306.
309. Jason Bardi, Schizophrenia Patients’ Ability to Monitor Reality May Be Helped by
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(quoting Sophia Vinogradov, MD, the study’s senior author and professor and interim associate
chief of staff for mental health at SFVAMC and interim vice chair of psychiatry at UCSF).
310. Id. (quoting Karuna Subramaniam).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In a perfect world, society would eliminate stigma and find a
complete cure without side effects for these severe mental illnesses
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311. FDA to Evaluate Computer-Based Treatment for Cognitive Symptoms in Schizophrenia,
BRAIN & BEHAVIOR RES. FOUND. (June 28, 2012), http://bbrfoundation.org/brain-mattersdiscoveries/fda-to-evaluate-computer-based-treatment-for-cognitive-symptoms-in.
312. Id.; see also Researchers Evaluate Computer-based Treatment for People with
Schizophrenia: Study Offers Hope for the Most-Costly Mental Illness in the United States,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS (June 27, 2012), http://www.mediawebsite.net/danews/story
/?catSetID=7007&catID=290937&nrid=160511845&page=1 (quoting Dr. Richard Keefe, stating
that “there are no FDA-approved treatments for this devastating aspect of the illness.”).
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FDA approval.311 Currently there are no FDA-approved treatments
for cognitive impairments—a “devastating aspect of the illness.”312
Certainly such treatments would be less intrusive than forced
medication, since they do not involve inserting a foreign substance
into the body. But these new developments are not entirely helpful to
the “less intrusive” analysis for several reasons. The computer-based
treatments do not currently address the psychosis, delusions, and
hallucinations associated with the positive symptoms of
schizophrenia. Therefore, they cannot be viewed as an alternative,
but rather an addition to psychotropic medications.
If at some point less intrusive means that could treat the positive
symptoms of schizophrenia were discovered or developed, this
would be relevant to allowing a patient to choose that form of
treatment rather than forced drugging. A patient would likely do so if
the concern was the severity of side effects of the drugs (as it often
is). But if a patient refused all types of treatment, perhaps either
because the patient did not believe or did not want to believe he or
she was ill, it would be impossible to force compliance with a
method such as computer training. Thus if a court were to decide
forced treatment was appropriate, it would presumably have to resort
to forced administration of antipsychotics rather than such less
intrusive treatments—unless a court order (or threat thereof)
convinced the patient to willingly submit to treatment. But as science
now stands, there is no alternative to drugs for stemming the positive
symptoms of schizophrenia.
Thus, at least in the context of the present scientific model, the
standard proposed above should be able to withstand common
constitutional challenges.
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that patients would gladly take on their own volition. As that
prospect looks distant under the current scientific regime, society
must strike a balance between autonomy and patient welfare that is
not blind to the unique limitations on decision-making for severely
mentally ill patients—especially during episodes of active psychosis.
And as scientific insights into these diseases accelerate, we must be
willing to revise standards to logically reflect that increased
understanding. This is one such effort. It, too, should be subject to
revision as the science and studies of outcomes continue to progress.
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